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SLUMLORDISM AS A TORT 




. ,, •. : , ..•.. 
* ..... --
[The cartoon is copyrighted by the Washington Post Co., 1949-from THE !IERBLOCK 
BOOK (Beacon Press 1952), reprinted with permission.] 
The case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average 
member of the community would arouse his resentment ... and lead 
him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"t 
Introduction 
ry-,im war against poverty has been fought with rather more vigor 
.1. than its initiators contemplated. Thus far, however, the major 
engagements have taken place in the streets of Watts and Chicago, 
which is not quite what they had in mind. Some, who think it odd 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard College; 
J.D. 1959, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
• • B.A. 1965, Whittier College; Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California 
at Berkeley.-Ed. 
t R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 46, comment d at 78 (1965). 
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that as we pass more laws we get more lawlessness,1 will perhaps con-
tent themselves by observing that the feeding hand is always bitten. 
Those less easily satisfied have begun to see the need for adopting 
some legal solutions as far reaching as the problems they are designed 
to abate; the following article is addressed to them. 
As an issue which is illustrative both of enormous need, and of 
great expenditure of traditional legal technology directed toward 
mitigating that need, perhaps nothing surpasses the problem of slum 
housing. Today, half a century after slum dwelling laws were widely 
enacted in response to public outrage,2 and a generation since the 
principle of public housing became operative,3 there remain vast 
numbers of urban housing units in which the most appalling living 
conditions continued to exist.4 Yet, it would be difficult to find a 
social wrong that has been more thoroughly and elaborately attacked 
in law. For example, New York, the first city of America in the 
quantity and detestability of its slum dwellings, as well as in other 
things, has at least five major legal devices designed to eliminate 
substandard housing: The owners of such housing can be criminally 
prosecuted;5 the offending building can be ordered vacated;6 rent 
can in some circumstances be withheld or abated;7 controlled rents 
can be involuntarily reduced;8 and the building can even be put into 
1. It has been widely observed that opportunity triggers increasing expectations, 
so that times of social progress are pre-eminently times of social unrest, with the level 
of dissatisfactions tending to outrun the rate of progress. E.g., 1 STOUFFER, THE AMER.I· 
CAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE 153, 257 (1949); Grimshaw, Lawlessness 
and Violence in America and Their Special Manifestations in Changing Negro-White 
Relationships, 44 J. NEGRO HIST. 52 (1959); Reston, The Shame of the Cities, N.Y. 
Times, July 24, 1966, p. !OE, col. 5. This recognition prompts, rather than pre-empts, 
the lawyer's task, for his role is to prevent the disorder which that gap engenders 
by providing legal forums into which new and legitimate demands may be 
channeled. 
2. See WENDT, HOUSING POLICY-THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 145 (1962); Comment, 
Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 
304, 315 (1965). 
3. The federally aided public-housing program began with the Housing Act of 
1937, 50 Stat. 888. 
4. The 1960 Census of Housing shows over 15 million deficient housing units, 
out of a total inventory of some 58 million units, of which over 6 million are either 
dilapidated or deteriorating and lacking plumbing facilities. U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING 
1960, vol. 1, States and Small Areas, Part 1 xxxvr. A committee of the Illinois General 
Assembly, after touring slum housing in 1965, reported: "It is hardly possible to 
believe that human beings live in a modem city in the conditions which the Com• 
mittee observed.'' REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRE· 
SENTATIVES ON SLUM HousING AND RENT GOUGING 4 Oune 1, 1965). See also the remarks 
of Vice President Humphrey, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 2. 
5. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 304; N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2040. 
6. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309. 
7. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 143 (b); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 302-a; N.Y. REAL 
PROP. ACTIONS LAW §§ 755, 776(b). 
8. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, app. § 34 (2) (McKinney 1961); N.Y.C. ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE CODE § Y-51-5.0 (h) (1963). 
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receivership, so that the city can make repairs and obtain a lien on 
rents to secure reimbursement.9 These are certainly strong-some 
might say draconian-measures; yet, despite their presence, abomi-
nable slum housing conditions persist in very great quantity. What is 
most notable about these remedies is neither their variety nor their 
severity, but rather their four common weaknesses. 
I. Because they are essentially public enforcement measures, 
they embrace all the most unattractive elements of paternalism. 
Although the tenant is a critically interested party, housing code en-
forcement is basically a two party proceeding, between the enforce-
ment official and the landlord, with the former deciding when and in 
what way to proceed, how vigorously to press enforcement,10 and 
what remedies to seek. Since the tenant is not vested with the basic 
prosecutorial initiative, nor with authority to control the proceeding, 
some third party must make for him decisions which vitally affect his 
interests, such as whether to take the risk that vigorous enforcement 
will lead to abandonment, eviction, or rent increases. These are deci-
sions which even the saintliest official would find it difficult to make 
with proper discretion and sensitivity. Is it then any wonder that 
housing code enforcement so often backfires, leaving its intended 
beneficiaries puzzled, resentful, and hostile, and thus more ready 
than ever to bite the paternalistic hand? 
2. While almost everyone agrees that the slum tenant has been 
wronged by the maintenance of seriously substandard housing, no 
serious effort has ever been made to see that he is compensated for 
the wrong that has been inflicted upon him. Ordinarily, enforcement 
officials are highly pleased if their work results in future improvement 
of the property; if they are successful in that effort, they are perfectly 
happy to let bygones be bygones. As one writer aptly put it, public 
authorities view their function as "obtaining compliance, not in 
fining landlords."11 Moreover, even where penal sanctions are exacted 
-and they have traditionally been ridiculously mild12-the proceeds 
9. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 309. 
10. Happily, there has been some movement toward tenant initiated remedies, but 
public action is still the overwhelmingly dominant factor in enforcement. Gribetz 
&: Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 CouJM. L. REv. 
1254, 1289 (1966). 
1 I. Note, Administration and Enforcement of the Philadelphia Housing Code, 
106 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 449 (1958). 
12. Gribetz &: Grad, supra note 10, at 1276; Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Prob-
lems Relating to Real Property, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 275, 278 (1966); Comment, En-
forcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 820-21 (1965). In 1965 
in New York City the average fine per case was $13.96. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1966, p. 
36, col. 5. See also LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARCH FUND OF COLU!IIBIA UNIVERSITY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, A PRELIMINARY REPORT PREPARED AS PART OF A STUDY OF HOUSING MAINTE• 
NANCE STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT 18, 39. (Dec. 31, 1964). 
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go into the public coffers; ordinarily not a penny goes to the tenant 
who has been subjected to living in indecent housing during all the 
time that the wrong went unremedied. While it is perhaps under-
standable that public officials look toward the future, it would hardly 
be surprising to discover that the tenants involved are dismayed to 
learn that the landlord who has deprived them of the benefits to which 
the law entitles them is not viewed as having thereby committed a 
wrong for which substantial redress may be had.18 Although it has 
been customary to treat Negro claims for reparations as little more 
than political rhetoric,14 it may be very wise indeed to attend seri-
ously to the just claims which may, in particular instances, underlie 
such demands. 
Not only does failure to recognize a right to damages unjustly 
trivialize past conduct, but it also ignores a factor so central to the 
problems of poverty and civil rights that its nonrecognition by the 
current legal structure can only be described as shocking. This ele-
ment is the retributive instinct, a fact of life which has emphatically 
shown its ugly side in the excesses of Watts and Harlem. The question 
is not whether to recognize the legitimacy of that emotion;15 but 
rather whether we are to meet it in the streets or in the courts. How-
ever outsiders may evaluate the owner of a rat-infested, filthy, or 
dilapidated building, it cannot be gainsaid that, to the tenant who 
lives therein, such a landlord is the embodiment of everything unjust 
in society.16 Unless and until we stop treating such owners as objects 
of sympathetic concern, and begin to treat them as persons who have 
13. The New York Rent Abatement Law (N.Y. MULT. DWELI.. LAw § 302-a) is a step 
in the right direction insofar as it wholly cancels, rather than merely delays pending 
repairs, the obligation to pay rent during the continuance of certain rent impairing 
violations. Unfortunately, it refuses to go beyond a mere loss of bargain notion in its 
view of the significance of the harm done to the tenant, and is thus painfully 
reminiscent of the inadequacy of auto warranties which limited the manufacturer's 
responsibility for defects to the cost of replacing defective parts. E.g., Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960). 
14. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1966, p. 12, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1966, p. 30, col. 5. 
15. See Schoenfeld, In Defense of Retribution in the Law, 35 PSYCHOANALYTIC 
Q. 108 (1966); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 401 
(1958). 
16. It is instructive to compare the generous attitude taken by the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, which found "that deterioration in housing is 
seldom the result of wilful action by the owner," SPECIAL CoMMitTEE ON HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO MULTIPLE 
DWELLING LAW PROVIDING FOR ABATEMENTS OF RENT TO TENANTS AFFECTED BY FIRE 
liAzARDs OR CONDmONS DANGEROUS TO LIFE, HEALTH OR SAFETY, WmcH REMAIN UN-
CORRECTED FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER NOTICE 2 (Dec. 19, 1963), with the rather remarkable 
"confessions" of a slumlord, appearing in a recent popular magazine: "The slumlord 
must subscribe to a predatory code or go under • • • • The good guy, the mildly 
greedy, humanoid slumlord, can't last •••• To be a good investor, he must learn to 
reduce people to cash values ••• .'' Dahl, A White Slumlord Confesses, Esquire, July 
1966, p. 92, 94.. 
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a large and long-overdue debt to pay, there is little reason to hope 
that their social creditors-the potential initiators of violence-will 
feel that justice has been done. 
3. Another matter little considered in the present law, although 
obviously central to the realities of enforcement, is the undeniable 
fact that the deplorable conditions of slum housing are attributable 
in significant part to the tenants themselves. This fact inevitably 
undermines rigorous enforcement,17 and leads to that form of pater-
nalism which views all tenants as non-culpable victims of an un-
feeling social system.18 While the question of the culpable tenant 
presents the nice philosophical problem whether the tenant is ir-
responsible because the landlord exploits him or whether the land-
lord is himself the victim of problem tenants, that dilemma need not 
be faced. Instead, we must impose rigorous standards on the landlord 
at the same time that, and only to the extent that, we give the slum 
tenant a genuine incentive to maintain the property he rents. Again 
the issue is paternalism: To enforce the codes for the benefit of all 
tenants, whether or not they do the right things themselves, is to 
view the tenant as an object to be acted upon and not as a potentially 
responsible and self-reliant•citizen. In this perspective, the proposal 
to be urged herein-that there be recognized a private tort action for 
th awarding of substantial damages to the tenant who is not himself 
culpable-may very well promote precisely that incentive to self-help 
and self-reliance which is so central to the poverty problem.19 In 
short, what is needed is not help, but incentive; not paternalism, but 
opportunity. 
4. Finally, and ironically, traditional code enforcement principles 
tend to be self-defeating because they are largely built upon an erron-
eous economic premise. The essential assumption of code enforce-
ment must be that the private owner of low-cost substandard housing 
can be compelled to rehabilitate and still serve the same or similarly 
17. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 
53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 319 (1965); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal Housing 
Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 810, 811, 823, 859 (1965). 
18. For example, in one case in New York, the Rent Commi5.5ion granted a rent 
reduction for failure of a landlord to repair a refrigerator deliberately damaged by the 
tenant. 150 Holding Corp. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 
14, 1955, p. 7, cited in SPECIAL COMMlTl'EE ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 16, at 3. Even to the extent that tenants are held responsible in law for their 
conduct, enforcement of such responsibility has been largely illusory. Comment, 
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 810-11 (1965). 
19. The point has often been made that ''[a) slum is not merely an area of decrepit 
buildings. It is a social fact •••• Where the slum becomes truly pernicious is when it 
becomes the environment of the culture of poverty, a spiritual and personal reality 
for its inhabitants as well as an area of dilapidation." l!AruuNGTON, THE OTHER AMER-
ICA 140-41 (1962); see notes 140-48 infra, 
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situated low-income tenants. All the evidence, however, points to the 
unlikelihood of any such result where major rehabilitation is re-
quired. The failure of the private unsubsidized market to provide 
new housing for the poor,20 the marked increase of rents after 
rehabilitation,21 the drop in real estate values in the face of serious 
code enforcement,22 all suggest what has by now become widely 
recognized: Standard housing for the poor, adequately maintained, 
is simply not a sufficiently profitable business to attract investors. 
Thus a vigorously pursued program of code enforcement is unlikely 
to have any long-term effect except to contract the already inade-
quate supply of low-cost housing. For this reason, code enforcement 
has traditionally degenerated into a watered down program in which 
the landlord's ability to survive economically becomes the critical 
issue.23 The result, predictably, is a tendency to negotiate the tenant's 
rights away with the hope that sooner or later an adequately financed 
rent-subsidy or public-housing program24 will eliminate the slums. 
In consequence, a vicious circle of non-action is created.25 
What is needed is a prolonged program of economic pressure 
which strikes, and strikes hard, at the slumlord. For the reasons 
20. Hearings on H.R. 9751 Before the Subcom~ittee on Housing of House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1964); LASCH, BREAKING 
THE BUILDING BLOCKADE 176-77 (1946); MEYERSON, TERRETT & 'WHEATON, HOUSING, 
PEOPLE AND CITIES 294 (1962); WEAVER, DILEMMAS OF URBAN AMERICA 79 (1965); 
WEAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 16 (1964). 
21. MILLSPAUGH & BRECKENFELD, THE HUMAN SIDE OF URBAN RENEWAL 108 (1960); 
NASH, R.EsIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND PUBLIC PURPOSES 124-28 
(1959); STERNLmB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 183 (1966); N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1966, 
p. 38, col. 4. 
22. Nash, op. cit. supra note 21, at 111. 
23. An excellent example of official attitudes is provided in Steven Roberts' article 
in the N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1966, p. 43, col. 3. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 10, at 
1270-72, report cases in which criminal convictions for housing violations have been 
reversed on grounds of economic hardship for the landlord. See Comment, Building 
Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. Cm. 
L. R.Ev. 180, 186 (1963). 
24. The Housing and Home Finance Administration (HHFA) explained the failure 
of public housing in a very genteel way: "Through a combination of circumstances, 
however, it has not been possible consistently to push this program with the vigor that 
it demands. Some years prior to the advent of this Administration, activity in this 
important area virtually halted." HHFA 18TH ANN. REP. 2 (1964). Another writer, 
somewhat more pungently, said that, when it came to public housing, "Congressmen 
tended to think small •••• " Seligman, The Enduring Slums, in THE ExPLODING ME-
TROPOLIS 121 (eds. of Fortune 1958). 1\Thether the grandiose hopes of the war on poverty 
will significantly alter the pattern of congressional thinking remains to be seen. 
At the moment, the prospect is. for a penurious Ninetieth Congress. 
25. This is not to deny that code enforcement, rent strikes, or tenants' unions are 
useful. It is simply to suggest that their successful functioning is limited to relatively 
small jobs of repair or maintenance, where the landlord's economic viability is not 
seriously affected. But this article is concerned with seriously deteriorated housing, 
and it is in this context that our comments about the inadequacy of code enforcement, 
rent strikes, and the like, are made. 
March 1967] Slumlordism 875 
indicated above, only tenants themselves can be expected to prose-
cute such a program effectively. The tenants can undertake such 
a program only when the law invests them both with an incentive to 
act and with some hope that their action will not only break the 
economic stranglehold of the slumlords, but will also produce some 
financial reward to ease the transitional problems of potential evic-
tions and higher rents. 
We believe that recognition of a substantial civil damage action-
one which holds that the slumlord who illegally maintains his prem-
ises in indecent conditions commits an actionable tort-may be a key 
to the slum housing dilemma. It must seem ironic that the tradi-
tional tort action, so much maligned for its wastefulness, delay, and 
cumbrousness, may be needed to supercede public enforcement, but 
we think that a tort remedy is precisely what is required. 
I. A REMEDY To Frr THE WRONG 
A. The Intentional lnfiiction Tort 
It is hardly a novel proposition today that, where one imposes 
upon another a serious indignity to advance the actor's mm economic 
purposes, an action for damages may lie. The brilliant work of Judge 
Magruder, 26 Dean Prosser27 and others in developing the action for 
intentional infliction of emotional harm has made that once radical 
assertion a commonplace. Their great contribution consisted of 
recognizing the need for a general tort category to redress conduct 
"regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity"28-a need that arose because of the technical limitations of 
such traditional torts as battery, trespass, and false imprisonment. 
That the intentional infliction tort has gone a long way toward 
fulfilling the need no one would deny. As it has developed, however, 
the tort leaves a most serious and disturbing gap in the law. To 
understand what that gap is and how it relates to the subject at issue 
here, it is necessary to examine briefly the present content of the tort. 
Under the definition contained in the Restatement of Torts, 
liability arises only when one intentionally engages in "extreme and 
outrageous conduct" and that conduct "causes severe emotional 
distress to another .... "29 The requirement that severe distress be 
26. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. 
REv. 1033 (1936). 
27. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional 
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939). 
28. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d at 73 (1965). 
29. Id.§ 46. 
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present as an element of the wrong is central to our concern here, 
and it is most important to understand the reasons for its inclusion. 
These reasons are twofold: First, of course, is the view that distur-
bance of the plaintiff's emotional tranquillity is itself the essence of 
the wrong. In light of the problems which the tort was designed to 
meet, such as the harassing bill collector or cruel practical joker, this 
was a perfectly appropriate notion; the essence of these defendants' 
conduct was precisely that they were attempting to infringe the 
plaintiff's emotional well-being in order to serve their own purposes. 
The second reason for the requirement of emotional distress 
was a more technical and practical one. Since the term "outrage" had 
little ascertainable content, it was understandably feared that actions 
might be brought to redress even the most trivial social abrasions, 
such as the harangues of a rude waiter or insolent taxi driver. To 
require the presence of severe mental distress would assure that 
recovery was permitted only for serious infringements, that is, those 
infringements likely to result (and which in fact do result) in serious 
emotional harm. Thus, whether conduct would be deemed out-
rageous would tum on whether the conduct would lead to "highly 
unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, 
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, 
and nausea."30 In testing the severity of these reactions, "the intensity 
and the duration of the duress are factors to be considered,"31 as is 
the fact that "normally, severe emotional distress is accompanied 
or followed by shock, illness, or other bodily harm, which in itself 
affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe."32 
That these tests provide a rational means for excluding relatively 
trivial conduct is clear enough. Whether they provide adequate scope 
to make actionable all the forms of outrageous conduct which the 
tort law ought to cover is, however, quite a different question; and 
since the intentional infliction category is the sole generic tort 
designed to cover extreme and outrageous conduct deemed "intoler-
able in a civilized community,"33 it is a question of considerable 
importance. 
The notion that the only outrageous conduct for which the tort 
law ought to provide a remedy is that which is designed to and does 
produce severe emotional harm-in the sense that the Restatement 
defines such harm-is by no means clear, for such a notion implies 
30. Id. comment j at 77. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Id. comment k at 78. 
33. Id. comment d at 73. 
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that the only interest worth protecting is that form of emotional 
well-being represented by an absence of such symptoms as fright, 
shock, grief and shame in their severe and disabling forms. The 
propriety of this view may be tested by looking at some analogues 
in constitutional law which also deal with outrageous conduct. 
B. Constitutional Analogies 
It is remarkable how closely the definition of outrage adopted by 
the Torts Restatement-conduct which "go[es] beyond all possible 
bounds of decency • . . and [is] utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community"84--echoes the language used in the constitutional cases. 
In his opinion in Irvine v. California,85 for example, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter urged that the proper test was whether the conduct at 
issue was such as to "offend civilized standards of decency and fair-
ness,"36 recalling that, in Rochin v. California,81 the Court had held 
the question to be whether the wrong was of such gravity as to "offend 
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of 
justice of English-speaking peoples . . . .''38 While the context in 
which the Court has put the question changes, ranging from defini-
tions of liberty,39 to asking whether the victim is subjected to "a 
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it,"40 
to attempts to identify those basic but penumbra! values that emanate 
from the specific terms of constitutional prohibitions,41 it is the same 
essential inquiry.42 And it is precisely the inquiry which the Restate-
ment of Torts formulates: When does conduct reach the point that 
we will say it is intolerable in a civilized society?43 
34. Ibid. 
35. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
36. Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion). 
37. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
38. Id. at 169. 
39. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (192ll). 
40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). 
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
42, This is not to suggest that the conflict within the Court over the proper 
method of dealing with these questions is trivial from the point of view of proper 
constitutional analysis. It is only meant to show that constitutional law has struggled 
with the same basic question, in the context of outrageous conduct by government, 
and that, as we shall see, it has never found it necessary to validate claims of infliction 
of outrage by looking to the extent or presence of emotional upset on the part of 
the victim. 
43. It is notable that in these constitutional cases the courts find themselves using 
the same sort of vituperative epithets so common in the intentional infliction tort cases. 
For example, in a recent electronic eavesdropping case, the New York courts termed 
the challenged action "reprehensible and offensive," "atrocious and inexcusable," 
"repulsive and repugnant." Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 149 (1962) (memorandum 
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren). 
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The parallel between the constitutional and tort tests is to be 
expected, for, as has often been noted, many of the civil wrongs 
synthesized into the intentional infliction genre are close counterparts 
of constitutional rights.44 The ordinary trespass has its constitutional 
incarnation in the search and seizure cases, 45 and the broader right 
of privacy, of which trespass is but one form, has been an underlying 
notion in such unconventional search and seizure cases as those 
involving eavesdropping,46 as well as in cases based upon intrusive 
commercialism on public transportation,47 or attempts to compel 
organizations to reveal their membership lists.48 The constitutional 
concepts involved in the freedom of travel cases,49 as well as in the 
prohibition against involuntary servitude,50 are intellectual com-
panions of the tort of false imprisonment. 
It is hardly surprising that there is a similarity and a very sub-
stantial overlap between that area of law designed to define and 
provide protection for fundamental human rights against govern-
ment infringements and that area designed to protect the individual 
against private conduct deemed intolerable in a civilized society. 
What is surprising, however, is that the tort principle, utterly unlike 
its constitutional counterpart, has been viewed as requiring the 
victim to suffer severe emotional distress as an indispensable prereq-
uisite to recovery.51 No such requirement has ever been thought to 
be necessary for the recovery of damages in the parallel constitu-
tional situations, and, indeed, any such demand there would seem 
fatuous. For reasons which are obvious and well known, civil damage 
44. E.g., GREGORY & KAI.VEN, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 822-23, 898 (1959); 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 392 (1960). 
45. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
46. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). 
47. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
48. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 
381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
49. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958). 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966). 
51. Perhaps one could argue that the parallel is imperfect because the sort of 
conduct under discussion here, though similar in content in both the tort and consti-
tutional context, is much more dangerous when carried on by the state than by 
private persons. We would not dispute such an assertion, but it is most difficult to 
conclude that the difference is so great that it goes to the very essence of the wrong, 
with private infringements being significant only insofar as they impose substantial 
disturbances of emotional tranquillity and governmental infringements standing by 
themselves as infringements of liberty which need no such proof for their validation. 
If evidence were needed of the dubiety of any such attempted distinction, one might 
tum to the decline of the state action concept, where every effort has been bent to 
bring essentially private action within the aegis of constitutional enforcement. E.g., 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I 
(1948). A similar development has taken place in the use of the authority to regulate 
commerce among the states. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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actions against officials for violation of constitutional rights have 
been relatively infrequent,52 but there are sufficient examples to make 
the point clear. In Lane v. Wilson,58 for example, a plaintiff who had 
been deprived of his right to vote sued and recovered $5,000 for 
infringement of that right. There was nothing in that case to suggest 
that plaintiff's claim rested upon a demand to be compensated for 
severe emotional ~istress, in the medical sense in which the Restate-
ment seems to use that term, or for economic loss. It was enough that 
he had inexcusably been deprived of a fundamental liberty, and 
substantial damages were thought appropriate to redress that depriva-
tion; in such circumstances, the gravity of the deprivation has never 
been thought to be measured by the immediate psychic impact upon 
the victim. Indeed, two hundred and fifty years ago, long before 
courts dreamed of speaking in terms of severe emotional distress, 
substantial damages were granted to individuals whose fundamental 
social rights had been infringed. As Chief Justice Holt put it, 
"If such an action [against one denying a vote] comes to be tried 
before me, I will direct the jury to make him pay well for it; it is 
denying him his English right."54 
It is not less serious to deprive one of the right to vote because 
that deprivation fails to induce fright, shock, or similar responses. 
In the same sense, it seems always to have been assumed that, for 
invasions of privacy in the form of unlawful searches, a substantial 
damage action would lie, not merely for severe emotional damage or 
for economic loss, but as a monetary attempt to redress the loss of 
liberty thus sustained. Surely it would be surprising to learn that the 
Justices who relegated the petitioner in Wolf v. Colorado55 to a 
common law damage action (however unrealistic that may h?ve been 
when one considers the prospect of recovery against police officers) 
thought that his right to vindication should depend upon the pres-
ence of severe emotional distress or pecuniary loss, rather than upon 
the loss of his liberty. Nor is it likely that the award of £300 granted 
in the landmark case of Entick v. Carrington,56 where officers rifled 
the papers of one suspected of publishing seditious libels, was meant 
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652·53, 670 (1961); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961). 
53. 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
54. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 958, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 138-39 (K.B. 1702). 
55. 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949). 
56. 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). Professor Westin has recently 
suggested that substantial liquidated damages be recoverable as a remedy for un-
authorized surveillance. Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals 
for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1229 (1966). 
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to redress that plaintiff's nervous response or to compensate him for 
the cost of replacing the pamphlets taken. 
Even more familiar today than the foregoing examples are those 
cases in which substantial damages are allowed for deprivations of 
the right to be free from racial discrimination. It shocks no one to see 
a Negro recover for being denied service at a place of public accom-
modation, or for being victimized through violation of a fair housing 
law,57 although by their very ordinariness, such acts are hardly likely 
to cause severe emotional distress. 58 Of course, recovery in cases of 
the sort mentioned _above ordinarily turns upon a statute granting a 
right to substantial civil damages, but, for our purposes, it is irrele-
vant whether the source of the right is in a statute or in the common 
law, as the identical results in the American (statutory) and English 
(common law) voting rights cases demonstrate. The point is that we 
consider it perfectly appropriate for one who has been deprived of a 
fundamental liberty, whatever the observable emotional impact on 
him, to recover substantial damages. 
Seen in this perspective, it becomes increasingly clear that the 
intentional infliction tort, for all its undeniable virtue, has over-
synthesized the traditional torts in focusing so exclusively on severe 
emotional harm. While many invasions of fundamental liberties 
are of course likely to lead to serious emotional and physical injury 
of the kind contemplated by the Restatement,59 it is equally true 
that a good deal of outrageous conduct may not, and often will not, 
have such results.60 The mere absence of such results, however, 
should hardly lead us to conclude that no serious wrong has been 
done to the victim. 
C. Implications of the Traditional Tort Law 
The idea implicit in these comments--that it would be more 
appropriate to view tort law as protecting substantive liberties, rather 
than merely as protecting emotional tranquillity in the conventional 
sense-was in fact very much the position of the traditional tort law. 
It is only the modern intentional infliction concept which, while 
57. E.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40, 41. 
58. As a recent newspaper article put it: "Despite the laws banning discrimination 
in public accommodations, Negro travelers know they can expect snubs, insults and 
outright rebuffs at restaurants, resorts and motels from Dixie as far north as Wis-
consin." Snubs and Rebuffs Still Spoil Vacation Travel for Many U.S. Negroes, Wall 
Street Journal, July 26, 1966, p. 1, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1966, p. XX-I, 
col. 5. 
59. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
60. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (racial discrimination); Lane 
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1989) (interference with voting rights). 
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properly rounding out the technical inadequacies of such old torts 
as trespass and battery, has unfortunately tended to submerge the 
substantive liberty point by excessive concentration on emotional 
well-being. For example, in the old offensive battery cases, where 
there was no great physical injury but merely an affront to the 
plaintiff's dignity, the courts were quite ready to grant substantial 
damages without worrying about severe emotional distress; they 
assumed that the libertarian interest in freedom of the physical 
person from indignant affronts was sufficient to permit the awarding 
of large damages, however the loss might have been manifested upon 
the victim.61 Similarly, recovery for false imprisonment traditionally 
required no proof of conventional damage beyond the fact of re-
straint on one's liberty.62 The list could easily be expanded, but the 
lesson should be clear enough. In asking whether the tort of outrage 
has been committed, and whether substantial damages ought to be 
allowed, it is time to cease looking merely for emotional distress and 
instead to ask whether the defendant's conduct infringes a sub-
stantive human interest of sufficient import that no civilized society 
ought to tolerate it. 
D. Nature of the Injury: The Inadequacy 
of Tort Law Perspectives 
The excessive concern with ascertainable evidence of emotional 
harm manifested in the present law bespeaks more than a theoretical 
error. By confusing the oft-present consequences of wrongs with the 
substantive essence of the wrong, the law produces a narrowness of 
outlook which creates a serious hiatus in the substantive coverage 
of tort remedies. 
Even in the most cursory examination of the wrongs for which 
the intentional infliction tort has given a remedy, one cannot help 
but be struck by the fact that this tort whose function is phrased in 
the broadest terms-compensation for those wrongs so outrageous 
that they must be deemed intolerable in a civilized society-has 
in fact occupied itself substantially with isolated, occasional, and 
bizarre occurrences, leaving virtually untouched the fundamental 
social issues of the day. We find recovery for the acts of the cruel 
prankster, the overbearing mortician, the oppressive bill collector, 
and even the rude shopkeeper, but no significant body of law 
has been developed to deal with such evils as slum housing, racial 
61. E.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872). 
62. PROSSER, TORTS § 12, at 55 (3d ed. 1964). 
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injustice, and economic exploitation. The man who tricks a crazy 
little old lady into believing that she has discovered the pot of gold 
at the end of the rainbow receives the profound attention of the 
court, 63 but the thousands of landlords who daily subject their tenants 
to life in rat and garbage infested tenements, with no heat in the 
winter and no ventilation in the summer, seem to have been com-
pletely ignored. 
To be sure, the reasons for this peculiar allocation of legal 
resources are many and complex, but clearly one of the most im-
portant is the determined focusing of attention upon the overt and 
dramatic consequences, called severe mental distress, sustained by the 
victim of unjustified intentional acts. It is easy enough to understand 
why a legal test that looks for fright, shock, and horror as neces-
sary elements of the ·wrong will find itself dealing with bizarre, extra-
ordinary, and unexpected acts; these are the very types of acts which 
evoke extraordinary and bizarre reactions by their victims. Con-
versely, such standards, useful as they are in filtering out everyday 
trivialities, fail to recognize that the tragic essence of fundamental 
social injustices is precisely that they are commonplace. One hardly 
expects the slum tenant to wake up one morning and experience 
profound shock, grief, and horror because his halls are filled with 
garbage and his apartment infested with rats. The indecency of his 
condition inheres in the fact that the outrage to which he is being 
subjected has become an ingrained part of his life, and an accepted 
fact of life to the surrounding community. 
Ironically, considerable evidence suggests that the readily ob-
servable consequences of many of the most grievous wrongs are 
almost precisely the opposite of those which the intentional in-
fliction tort characterizes as evidence of outrage. A large body of 
literature dealing with such subjects as racial discrimination, 
Japanese relocation, brainwashing, and long-term incarceration in-
dicates the inadequacy of a law which fails to take sufficient account 
of the complexities, varieties, and cumulative effects which can 
result from seriously outrageous conduct. For example, the tremen-
dous pressures on one in a detestable situation to adapt to his environ-
ment and to seek to normalize his situation as a matter of self-defense 
and survival64 are apparently not taken into account in our present 
63. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920). 
64. This is what Robert Weaver calls "conditioning to a submerged status." 
WEAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 30 (1964); see BROOM &: KrrsusE, THE MANAGED CASU-
ALTY, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN FAMILY IN WORLD WAR II (1956); SCHORR, SLUMS AND 
SOCIAL INSECURITY 12 (U.S. Dep't H.E.W., Social Security Admin., Div. of Research and 
Statistics Research Report No. 1, 1963); U.S. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING PROGRAM OF THE 
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law dealing with outrageous conduct. Similarly, the significance of 
imposed personality modifications, with all their intricate meaning,65 
seems to be ignored. 
The contrast between the kinds of damage that can occur and 
the much more limited view of damage evidenced in the current tort 
law is strikingly illustrated by a study of the effects of intentionally 
imposed chronic stress on Korean War prisoners: 
It was difficult to maintain close group ties if one was competing 
with others for the essentials of life, and if one spent one's resting 
time in overcrowded huts .... Lines of authority often broke down, 
and with this, group cohesion and morale suffered . . . . In this 
situation goals became increasingly short-run .... 
What happened to the men under these conditions? During the 
one to two week marches they became increasingly apathetic .... 
[S]ome men became so apathetic that they ceased to care about their 
bodily needs. They retreated further into themselves, refused to eat 
even what little food was available, refused to get any exercise, and 
eventually lay down as if waiting to die. The reports were emphatic 
concerning the lucidity and sanity of these men. They seemed willing 
to accept the prospect of death rather than to continue fighting a 
severely frustrating and depriving environment. 
Two things seemed to save a man who was close to such "apathy" 
[from] death: Getting him on his feet and doing something, no 
matter how trivial, or getting him angry or concerned about some 
present or future problem .... In one case ... "therapy" consisted 
of kicking the man until he was mad enough to get up and fight.66 
While the prisoners' situation was of course considerably more 
severe and exacerbated than one would ordinarily encounter in a 
tort case, it presents a telescoped, but nonetheless highly revealing, 
view of the kinds of symptoms which tend to be engendered over 
the long run by deplorable and seemingly inescapable living con-
ditions. 67 Such examples are most instructive in suggesting how 
SCHOOL FOR OVERSEAS ADMINISTRATION, INDIVIDUAL AND MASS BEHAVIOR IN EXTREME 
SITUATIONS (1944). 
65. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 
(1959); FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING (1963); LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1961); SCHEIN, SCHNEIER &: BARKER, COERCIVE PERSUASION 
(1961) (Studies of Brainwashing in China). "[S]lums breed a hopelessness in peoples' 
hearts.'' MILLSPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, op. cit. supra note 21, at ix. 
66. Schein, Reaction Patterns to Severe, Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners 
of War of the Chinese, J. Soc. IssuES, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 21, 22-23 (1957). 
67. Speaking of the concentration camp as "a special and highly perverted instance 
of human slavery," Stanley Elkins sees parallels between the way Nazi concentration 
camps changed the personalities of the prisoners who survived and the way in which 
slavery in the American South altered the personalities of Negroes brought from Africa 
and shaped the character of the Negroes born here. ELKINS, op. cit. supra note 65, at 
103-39. Perhaps a useful parallel can also be drawn between the effects on the per• 
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lamentably naive and short-sighted the tort law has been in its view 
of what constitutes legally remediable damage. 68 
The example also demonstrates how much more enlightened the 
interpreters of the constitutional law have been in analogous situa-
tions; their willingness, as indicated above, 69 to recognize grievous 
social injustices as remediable wrongs, without searching for specific 
types of medical trauma, represents an awareness of the long-term 
and cumulative consequences of oppression, which consequences are 
capable of no precise and clearly observable delineation in traditional 
legal terms. This is to say that the accumulated evidence of the effects 
of social injustice, as presented by psychiatrists and sociologists in 
clinical form, has long been understood and accepted by the Court, 
though in a different form. When it talks about conduct so shocking 
that the polity cannot endure it, or about civilized standards of 
decency and fairness, it is doing no more than observing from an 
historical and political science perspective the cumulative destructive 
effects of outrageous conduct on the society and its individual 
victims-precisely analogous to what the psychiatrists observe in such 
clinical contexts as that of the Korean War prisoners. In condemning 
sonalities of concentration camp inmates and of slum inhabitants; both groups mani-
fest obvious "emotional distress" through the widespread symptom of apathy. Com-
pare SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 46, 71, 120 (1964), with FRANKL, op. cit. 
supra note 65, at 35. 
68. The quantity of studies dealing with the adverse effects of bad housing is quite 
overwhelming. One hardly knows what to say of the evidence. The animal studies are 
fascinating and provocative, but hardly conclusive. E.g., SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64; 
Calhoun, Population Density and Social Pathology, in THE URBAN CONDITION 33 (Duhl 
ed. 1963). The correlation studies, comparing the situation of those within and 
without slum housing, are likewise revealing, but insofar as they tend to suggest that 
slums alone are the critical factor in social pathology, one must view them as naive. 
Many such studies are discussed and cited in Wilner &: Walkley, Effects of Housing on 
Health and Performance, in THE URBAN CONDITION supra at 215. Certainly improving 
the housing of those in the culture of poverty will not, alone, bring to an end the 
disabilities which that culture promotes; no more than remedying nutritional deficien-
cies in a concentration camp would terminate the ills of that culture of disorientation. 
Nonetheless, that the conditions of indecent housing, and the pattern of exploitation 
of which it is a part, contribute significantly to the making of that culture of poverty 
and to the violent misbehavior which it produces is the conclusion of virtually every 
observer. See notes 4, 19, 20, 21 supra, and notes 86, 93, 113, 125, 126, 140, 141, 147, 
186 infra passim. To be sure, no one can produce proof of·this in the sense that one 
can prove, in a battery case, that A broke B's leg, just as no one can prove the virtues 
of democracy, free speech, or disinterested judges, but, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter once 
said: "[T]here comes a point where this Court should not be ignorant as judges of 
what we know as men." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). One author, briefly 
noting the possibilities for an action such as we propose, asked, "Has the time not 
come for the Bar and Bench to accept that the situations described by James Baldwin, 
Michael Harrington, Kenneth Clark and others are also cases of "personal injury ••• 
for which damages should be recoverable?" Joost, Rent Strike-New Legal Weapon?, 
Trial, June-July 1966, p. 48. 
69. See notes 34-60 supra and accompanying text. 
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and granting relief against involuntary servitude, for example, one 
can talk in terms of an invasion of liberty, noting the historically 
observable consequences of such treatment; to this observation one 
may give the name "deprivation of basic liberty," or "conduct intol-
erable in a civilized society." Much the same conclusion might be 
reached by a study of psychological or sociological evidence. The 
approach used is not critical; what is critical is that some approach 
be used which makes it possible to come to terms with the realities 
of social justice. In respect to this critical reality the tort law, as 
presently formulated, fails. 
The limited perspective of the tort law may be demonstrated 
not only by reference to constitutional and psychological analogies, 
but also by contrast to even such conventional examples as anti-
trust law. In that area, it has long been understood that anticompeti-
tive behavior, the dramatic results of which are manifested largely 
in cumulative effects on the economic structure of the society, reaches 
that ultimately destructive point only through intermediate and 
often intangible effects on particular victims.7° Consequently, the 
treble damage action is a remedy uniquely responsive to the peculiar 
problems created when unlawful conduct is doing damage far more 
serious than overtly appears at a given time. Such a remedy not only 
permits recovery in amounts beyond those capable of traditional 
legal proof, but it also has two other important effects. First, permit-
ting the recovery of very large damages implies a recognition that 
the challenged conduct has an importance far beyond that which 
it might seem to have if one attended only to presently observable 
consequences. In this respect, the treble damage action serves to 
resolve the dilemma created by the fact that the real importance of 
the conduct might become apparent too late, that is, after the cumu-
lative effects of the defendant's and others' acts had brought about 
the very results which the law is designed to prevent.71 Moreover, by 
granting treble recovery to private persons, the antitrust law rec-
ognizes that, though certain wrongs are in one sense violations of 
the interest of the public at large, they are also wrongs which impinge 
quite seriously upon individuals in the society; that adequate redress 
can never be given merely by public remedies; and that very sub-
70. Some critics of the Court's approach in antitrust cases are upset precisely 
because the breadth of analysis utilized in the constitutional area seems to have been 
carried over to the merger cases. Handler, Atonality and Abstraction in Modern 
Antitrust Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 621, 623-24 (1966). If this is the "New Gestalt" (id. at 623) 
so be it; we need more of it. 
71. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294-, 301 (1964-); Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 221-22 (1938). 
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stantial compensation is due those individuals who are the immediate 
victims of the conduct under attack.72 
The relevance of these developments to the slum housing situa-
tion should be clear. As we have already observed, the difficulty slum 
tenants have in establishing traditional kinds of damage is consider-
able. Yet, rather than viewing such difficulties as an indication that 
nothing bad is happening, as the tort law is prone to do, those con-
cerned with antitrust law have expanded their horizons so as to take 
account of unconventional forms of damage. 73 Perhaps the best 
example of this is the current concern over conglomerate mergers, 
where it is now widely conceded that a large company's acquisition of 
a firm in a competitive small-company industry is likely to have a 
variety of inhibiting effects on the market, among them raising 
psychological barriers to potential entrants and stifling the behavior 
of incumbents who must now operate in the shadow of a giant.74 At 
any intermediate point, such effects are likely to be manifested in 
rather limited ways on any individual competitor, and at any stage 
will probably be very difficult to reduce to traditional modes of proof. 
While the extent to which damages will be given in recognition of 
such effects has not yet been conclusively settled, there is some 
judicial inclination to view the very consummation of an illegal 
merger as an injury to the plaintiff's business for which a treble 
damage action could be appropriate.75 In taking such a view, the 
72. Though the treble damage action is built upon a multiplier of actual damage 
in the conventional sense, this does not convert the principle underlying it to a 
conventional damage notion, but merely embodies the convenient fact that anticom-
petitive behavior, unlike voting discrimination or slumlordism, does have some 
immediate economic consequences which provide a plausible basis for quantifying 
the wrong. Only the multiplier effect is of interest here, and that is a quite arbitrary 
one insofar as ordinary damage theory is concerned. It might just as well be double 
damages, as some statutes provide, or some fixed sum-such as .$2,000-set as remedial 
damages, which is to be given to the victim of the wrongful conduct. Rex Trailer Co. v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956). See also N.Y. Times, July 17, 1966, p. 56, col. 7 
(treble damages sought for tenants in rent control law violation cases). 
73. In Continental Can, the Court said that where a merger is "inherently suspect, 
elaborate proof" of the traditional kind "may be dispensed with" so that the courts 
can reach conduct that affects not only "existing competition but that which is 
sufficiently probable and imminent." United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 
441, 458 (1964). 
74. See Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM. 
L. REv. 500, 512-19 (1964); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1362-86 (1965). Similarly, the Court has taken 
account of the probability that any significant merger is relevent not only for "its 
intrinsic effect on competition," but because it has a tendency toward "triggering other 
mergers." United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 464 (1964). 
75. Highland Supply Co. v. Reynolds Metal Corp., 245 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (E.D. 
Mo. 1965); cf. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
Other courts have taken a much narrower view of the right to damages. Highland 
Supply Co. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. 
Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964). 
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courts would bring themselves into alignment with the position 
traditionally taken as to the appropriateness of damages for the viola-
tion of human liberties. 
Moreover, the antitrust law has firmly recognized another factor 
most relevant to the situation of the slum landlord. It is that defen-
dant's immediate conduct cannot be isolated from its larger social 
significance. Thus, though a slum landlord would undoubtedly recoil 
from any attempt to link his conduct to ghetto riots,76 the antitrust 
law teaches that such associations are highly relevant. For example, 
it has been held that it is not a defense in a merger case that the single 
act under attack does not itself show the imminence of monopoly; 
it is held irrelevant that "accretions of power are individually ... 
minute."77 Nor, as the Court made clear in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, lnc.,78 is anticompetitive conduct to be immunized from 
a treble damage remedy "merely because the victim is just one 
merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little 
difference to the economy."79 Individual acts must be tested, not in 
isolation, but by whether in the aggregate they tend to create a 
monopoly. The fact that other independent actors are promoting 
that tendency by their independent conduct-far from being a 
defense-is a factor enhancing liability.80 This is an approach well 
worth keeping in mind when a slum landlord's culpability is tested 
against the background of a market plagued by poverty, shortages, 
the artificial restrictions of racial discrimination, and the presence 
of other independent exploiters of the poor. 
The courts' ability in the area of economic regulation to see the 
importance of granting substantial and more than conventionally 
provable damages, to recognize the cumulative significance of seem-
ingly fragmentary behavior, and to do so in a form which "use[s] 
private self-interest as a means of enforcement, ... arm[ing] injured 
persons with private means to retribution ... ,"81 provides a model 
which the tort law would do well to emulate. 
E. The Need for a Vindicatory Element in the Law 
There is yet another sense in which the intentional infliction tort 
inadequately implements a vital function of the legal system, and 
76. The responsibility of the landlord as an individual, as distinguished from the 
responsibility of the society at large for slum conditions, will be discussed at text 
accompanying notes 87-92 infra. 
77. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333-34 (1962). See also United 
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461, 465 (1964). 
78. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
79. Id. at 213. 
80. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 (1962). 
81. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947). 
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again it is a sense in which the present generic tort has seemingly 
eliminated a fundamental principle which was well known to the 
traditional law. This is the role of the tort law in providing the 
prospect of monetary redress for the victim of an outrageous indignity 
in order to channel the instinct for retribution into acceptable 
channels.82 Here again the social need for redress cannot properly 
be measured by the presence or absence of "severe emotional dis-
tress," a point often recognized by traditional authorities. In the 
famous old case of Alcorn v. Mitchell,83 for example, where an 
award of $1,000 was given after a disappointed litigant spit in the 
eye of his opponent, there was no evidence that the plaintiff was 
seeking recovery for any of the medical injuries ordinarily com-
prehended within the meaning of sever~ emotional distress, nor did 
the court treat the case as involving any such injury. Its language 
in this regard is most instructive: 
The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provoc-
ative of retaliation by force, and the law, as far as it may, should 
afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way of 
liberal damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by 
saving the necessity of resort to personal violence as the only means 
of redress.84 
In one sense, to be sure, Alcorn could be viewed as consistent with 
the Restatement test of mental distress, for one of the Restatement's 
articulated symptoms is "anger." Moreover, in the context of the 
immediate physical confrontation, the anger may have been observ-
ably intense. But Alcorn is notable not in the sense that it can be 
made to conform to the present test, but rather in that its rationale 
goes beyond that test, suggesting that an action should lie for out-
rageous conduct likely to lead to violent reprisal. In many instances, 
of course, there will be no observable intense anger, but the ultimate 
prospect of violence in retribution may exist in far more socially 
significant ways than it did in Alcorn v. Mitchell. 
This point was well stated by Jerome Hall in his discussion of 
the function of some traditional torts which have conceptually 
been subsumed within the intentional infliction genre: 
[M]ost of these [torts] are intentional aggressions which usually imply 
moral culpability, and almost always stimulate resentment .... In 
82. For example, the function of defamation actions in preventing violence has long 
been recognized. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64 n.6 (1966). Our 
point is not that intentional infliction cases contain no element of retribution, but 
rather that they refuse to recognize that the need to provide retribution alone-even 
where there is no conventional severe distress--is sufficient to give rise to a cause of 
action. 
83. 63 Ill. 553 (1872). 
84. Id. at 554. 
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this type of harm the law of torts frequently functions as a punitive 
apparatus-the "fine" going to the injured victim of the aggres-
sion ..•. 
The civil judgment is an authoritative vindication of the injured 
person's rights. Besides he is here not dependent on the public 
authorities for prosecution, and remains master of the proceedings.85 
The relevance of these observations to the situation of the slum 
tenant need hardly be proved to anyone who has followed the recent 
happenings in Harlem, Watts, Chicago, and elsewhere around the 
nation. As one observer of slum life put it, the objects of slum 
injustice develop "at each turn, symptoms of anxiety, despair, rage 
and, finally, socially troublesome behavior, which means that all those 
feelings come to their boiling point."86 It hardly seems excessive to 
observe that Alcorn v. Mitchell has begot progeny of frankensteinian 
proportions to which the law must respond. 
II. ELEMENTS OF THE WRONG 
The preceding section discussed in general the propriety of allow-
ing a substantial civil damage action to be brought by a slum tenant 
subjected to living in indecent housing. Nothing has yet been said of 
what, precisely, is meant by "subjection," or what is comprehended 
within the term "indecent." Thus the scope of the landlord's respon-
sibility as an individually culpable wrongdoer, and the substance of 
the wrong for which relief ought to be granted, remain to be 
discussed. 
A. The Culpable Landlord 
Decent housing as a primary goal of society has been so long and 
vigorously urged by Presidents, 87 the Congress, 88 distinguished 
citizens,89 and local legislatures90 as to be beyond dispute. To make 
85. Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 967, 977 
(1943). 
86. Coles, Our Streets of Violence, The New Republic, Sept. 5, 1964, p. 19, 21. See 
also N.Y. Times, May 22, 1966, p. 70, col. 3. 
87. no Cong. Rec. 114, 1103 (1964) (President Johnson); 107 Cong. Rec. 3641-42 
(1961) (President Kennedy); 100 Cong. Rec. 737 (1954) (President Eisenhower); 95 Cong, 
Rec. 74, 144 (1949) (President Truman). 
88. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) ("the goal of a decent home 
and a suitable living environment for every American family''). 
89. "The goal of a decent home for every American family is an accepted national 
objective." Weaver (then Administrator, U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency), 
Foreword to HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, OUR. NoNWIUTE POPULATION iii (1963). 
See also A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT HOUSING 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON GoVERNMENT HOUSING POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMS 256-57 (U.S. Gov't Print. Office, Dec. 1953); Report of the President's Com-
mission on National Goals, in GoAI.S FOR AMERICANS 1, 13 (1960); Wurster, Framework 
for an Urban Society, in id. at 225, 235 (1960). 
90. E.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 997, § 1. 
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unexcused interference with the attainment of that goal a wrong 
remediable at law would seem to be precisely the objective the 
law ought to be pursuing. 
As the following pages should make clear, nothing herein is meant 
to suggest that the mere failure of society to realize some national 
goal with respect to a given individual should give that individual a 
tort action. Though adequate medical care for all might be an im-
portant national goal, the refusal by a doctor to accept as a patient 
one too poor to pay his fees would not be tortious; to allow an action 
in such a case would be to impose the cost of a broad social failure on 
a single individual. We propose nothing of the sort; our much more 
limited proposal is that one who undertakes to perform a service for 
his own economic benefit, but who performs it in a way both incon-
sistent with those standards which represent minimum social goals as 
to decent treatment and in a manner that itself is violative of the law, 
under circumstances where the victim had no meaningful alternative 
but to deal with him, commits a tort for which substantial damages 
ought to lie. 
There is, to be sure, a sense in which the slum landlord is the 
product, rather than the creator, of the problem in which he is in-
volved. That there is poverty, which creates the demand for v~ry low-
cost housing, is not his fault; that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
maintain such housing in acceptable condition and still make an 
adequate profit is likewise not a matter of his making; so too, the 
failure of Congress to make available public housing or rent subsidies 
in sufficient amounts to mitigate the problem is hardly something for 
which he can be held individually responsible. 
These are social problems for which only the community as a 
whole bears responsibility. But no one seeks to impose liability upon 
the landlord for the mere presence of these conditions. He becomes 
culpable, and thus responsible as an individual, only when he cap-
italizes upon these social ills as the means to earn his livelihood. In 
this sense he stands in the same position as one who employs chil-
dren in a factory or mine; the fact that conditions may exist which 
create a market for child labor hardly excuses the conduct of one 
who affirmatively utilizes those conditions to make his way in the 
world. The seller of narcotics or other illicit goods is not thought 
less culpable merely because he caters to a condition not of his crea-
tion, or because the transaction is compelled by the exigencies of 
human weakness and suffering rather than by any physical act of 
force on his part. Nor can it diminish his responsibility that his own 
economic survival depends upon giving as little as he does for the 
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price he exacts. One would not dream of permitting a pharmaceu-
tical firm to sell impure and adulterated drugs at low prices merely 
because that was all they could afford to provide to the market of 
the poor. Nor would we permit a doctor to give inadequate treat-
ment, or a Ia-wyer inadequate representation, to the poor simply be-
cause their fees could not economically justify more ample services. 
Our universal answer to such people is that they may stand aside 
and do nothing if they wish, but if they undertake to provide services 
for their own economic benefit, they must serve adequately or be 
deemed ·wrongdoers in law. That society at large has failed in making 
needed service available at prices all could afford is no excuse for 
them as individuals. 
There is, without question, the paradox that the government, by 
failing to act, effectively creates the market for the defendant's services 
at the same time that it declares unlawful through housing codes the 
very conditions which may make the business of providing such 
services profitable. It is in this sense true that the defendant is pro-
viding a needed service. It is also true that, by making the slum 
housing business much less attractive, the prospect of substantial 
damages would, in the short run, tend to contract an already over-
crowded market, and thus seemingly disadvantage the very people 
whom the action is designed to help. Indeed, it is this very logic 
which has so often undermined rigorous enforcement of the housing 
codes, engendering fear that unless a "realistic" position were taken 
toward the landlord, more harm than good might result from the 
enforcement of the law.91 
This is the paradox which has created the present slum housing 
dilemma. Landlords are insulated from effective law enforcement in 
order to avert an intensification of the low-cost housing shortage; 
yet this very insulation not only perpetuates the indecent conditions 
of the slums, but also prevents the creation of the intense pressure 
needed for legislative action by preserving the status quo in its more 
or less stable (albeit deplorable) condition. At some point we must 
admit that if we want this circle to be broken, some action sub-
stantially more vigorous than the utterance of pieties and the en-
actment of inadequately financed legislation must be taken. It 
would be difficult to find a less unjust means of breaking that circle 
than by reallocating some money from slum landlords to their 
91. NASH, R.EsIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND PuBLIC PURPOSES 103 
(1959); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 
802 (1965); Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conseroation of 
Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 180, 186 (1963); N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 
1966, p. 43, col. 3. 
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tenants through a procedure whereby the tenants themselves have the 
authority to initiate and prosecute the suits.92 
Those who propose action against slum landlords are often met 
with the argument that the owners of these properties are not evil-
doers, but simply businessmen in a high-risk market who must, as a 
matter of economic survival, take rather rigorous measures. From this, 
it is often urged that those who attack "slumlords" are simply tugging 
an emotional string and are oblivious to objective economic facts. 
We hope to avoid these charges by making our position perfectly 
explicit: We do not characterize the slum landlord as a conscious or 
willing evildoer; we agree that he is probably doing precisely what a 
rational profit-seeking businessman in his circumstances would feel 
required to do. We simply say that if it is true that slum ownership is a 
business which requires the maintenance of such indecent conditions, 
then this is a business which needs to be eliminated. Moreover, let us 
not be deluded by the landlord's continued emphasis on the eco-
nomic pressures which the slum housing business imposes on one who 
is in it; let us recognize that what we are condemning him for is going 
into (or staying in) such a business. Nothing forced him into buy-
ing a slum, except his own profit expectations. If he inherited such 
properties or found himself a landlord in a deteriorating neighbor-
hood, nothing forced him to stay except his willingness to sub-
ordinate the life of his tenants to the prospect of some economic 
loss. As long as a landlord is willing to see his tenants' children 
bitten by rats in the night rather than take his losses and get out of 
the business-and that is the choice which our potential defendants 
have made-we see no need to wonder whether an injustice would 
be done in characterizing them as tortfeasors. 93 
92. For a discussion of what can be expected to happen to the market as a result 
of some successful damage actions, and why we think the results to be anticipated 
need not be feared, see text accompanying notes 211-13 infra. 
93. It is not without relevance that observers quite uniformly find the slum 
housing business to be a quite profitable one. THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN 
REDEVELOPMENT 13, 19 (Woodbury ed. 1953); ILLINOIS GENERAL .AssEMl!LY, REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON SLUM HOUSING AND RENT GOUG• 
ING 3-4 (1965); I.AsCH, BREAKING THE BUILDING BLOCKADE 16 (1946); MILLSPAUGH & 
BRECKENFELD, THE HUMAN SIDE OF URBAN RENEWAL 230 (1960); SCHORR, op. cit. supra 
note 64, at 93-94; STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 76-88, 95-96, 106, 119 (1966); 
Seligman, The Enduring Slums, in THE ExPLoDING METROPOLIS 120 (eds. of Fortune 
1958). To be sure, quite another story is told by landlords, KLEIN, LET IN THE SuN 
141-68 (1964), but on examination one sees that the landlords ordinarily measure 
profitability only by contrasting income and expenses over a given period, failing to 
consider that slum housing is often an investment where the real profits may be made 
through sales which take advantage of such tax devices as depreciation. ILLINOIS 
GENERAL .AssEMBLY, supra at 2; Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement 
of Substandard Rousing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 320 n.83 (1965); cf. STERNLIEB, op. cit. 
supra at 101-02, Alternatively, the management of the slum dwelling may be a holding 
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B. Imposition by the Landlord: Absence of Free Choice 
I. The Claim That the Tenant Should Allocate More 
Money to Housing 
893 
The slum landlord should not be permitted the defense that his 
renting of indecent housing is simply an ordinary market transaction, 
voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the tenant. Though most 
Americans enjoy incomes permitting considerable consumer choice 
in the housing market, those who comprise the slum-housing popu-
lation are overwhelmingly the very poor,94 those at or near the sub-
sistence level.95 For these persons, the range of choice is exceedingly 
operation through which the owner keeps his head above water while he waits for land 
values to rise and bring him his profit. Dahl, A White Slumlord Confesses, Esquire, 
July 1966, p. 92, 112. STEiu"ILIEB, op. cit. supra at 119, found that slum properties are 
sometimes part of a falling real estate market, but this simply intensifies the pressure 
for rental profits, generally through reduced maintenance. Moreover, it is not a 
cause for sympathy that some buyers of slum properties, through lack of experience 
or through ignorance, find themselves losing money; like the small speculator in the 
stock market who finds himself overwhelmed by bigger sharks, the losing slum owner 
may simply be the victim of his own greed. The potential defendants in these cases 
are not those who invest in limited dividend low-cost housing enterprises, seeking a 
very modest return on their money, NASH, op. cit. supra note 91, at 114-24, but rather 
they are those who seek, and often get, large profits. SCHORR, op. cit. supra at 94; Selig-
man, supra at 120. While it may be true that many slum owners are themselves "little 
fellows" rather than tycoons with thousands of properties, STERNLIEB, op. cit. supra 
at 118, this hardly seems a basis for sympathetic treatment. It is a common and 
unfortunate fact that the dirtiest work of exploitation is frequently left to small-timers, 
with the owners of great capital able to make satisfactory profits in more respectable 
investments. This simply proves that one with a million dollars can invest in bonds 
and make a comfortable living clipping coupons, while the fellow with a few thousand 
dollars must get his hands dirty if he wants to produce a satisfactory income from his 
capital. But it is well to remember that not all small investors find themselves com-
pelled to get rich quickly, and it remains to be shown why those who have such 
desires ought to be permitted to fulfill them at the expense of the poorest people in 
society. 
94. ABRAMS, THE CITY Is THE FRONTIER 26 (1965); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64, at 
98; TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON Low INCOME HOUSING, A REvmw AND APPRAISAL 
OF NEW YoRK STATE'S Low INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM 37-38 (1963). 
95. The President's Council of Economic Advisors originally defined the "poor" 
as "those who are not now maintaining a decent standard of living" and set the 
poverty line for a family of four at $3,000. H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 88TH 
CONG,, 2D. SESs., POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Comm. Print 1964). The Social 
Security Administration found $3,100 necessary for a non-farm family of four to live 
decently on an "economy-plan" budget and $3,980 for the same family on a "low-cost" 
budget. Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, 28 Soc. 
SEc. BuLL. 3, 10 (1965). The Bureau of Statistics of the United States Department of 
Labor has not yet published a minimum or subsistence budget, but it plans to do so 
soon. See note 99 infra. Higher estimates than these have been given by respected 
authorities, including the widely cited budget prepared by the Community Council 
of Greater New York which found that a typical four-person household in 1963 
required $6,268 for an "adequate" living standard. THE COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF 
GREATER NEW YoRK, A FAMILY BUDGET STANDARD 58 (1963). Even the Community 
Council's criteria have been described as yielding a "low estimate of the cost of 
living," MORGAN, DAVID, CoHEN & BRAZER, INCOME AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED 
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narrow. Having allocated a reasonable sum to housing, further out-
lays for shelter can be made only by reducing below the subsistence 
level their allocation for food, clothing, medical care, and other 
personal necessities. 
The dilemma for such families is best illustrated by a specific 
example. The Philadelphia subsistence budget96 developed by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare-a budget which is 
typical of those in use in other major metropolitan areas--shows that 
an average family of four needs an annual income of $3,168 to "main-
tain a minimum standard of health and decency."97 Of this, only $68 
per month ($816 per year or 25.7 per cent of total income) can be 
allotted as an "approximate maximum"98 for rent; excluding fuel and 
utilities, without depriving the family of other basic requirements. 
Any slum tenant with such an income and paying this maximum 
toward rent has only a Robson's choice: He can remain in indecent 
housing and suffer the consequences, or he can overallocate to rent 
and deprive his family of other necessities of life. To say that a tenant 
who has made a rational allocation-paying the maximum rent he 
can reasonably afford, but no more-should be denied his action 
because he did not exercise that theoretical choice to underallocate 
to other necessaries is to drain any meaning from the idea of "choice." 
To have a choice is to have tenable alternatives; the subsistence-
income tenant who takes what he can get for the maximum rent that 
he can afford is exercising about as much free choice as the customer 
who acquiesces in the terms of a utility or common carrier's service 
contract. 
STATES 189 (1962). A $3,000 budget allows a family of four a daily expenditure 
of only $.70 per person for food and $1.40 for all other needs including rent, clothes, 
medical care, etc. Yet, according to the 1960 census, about 34.5 million people 
subsisted at incomes below this minimum poverty line. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, 
and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 407, 422 n.44 (1966); Miller, Who Are the 
Poor'!, 200 THE NATION 609 (1965). See also David, Welfare, Income, and Budget Needs, 
41 REv. OF EcoN. AND STATISTICS 393-99 (1959); N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1966, p. 12, col. 5. 
96. These budgets, used to determine state allowances for public assistance, repre-
sent the considered judgment of individual state research councils as to the minimum 
cost for decent living for various family compositions. Each budget works out in 
scrupulous detail the differing needs for families, taking into consideration factors 
of family size and location, ages and sex of members, and any individual disabilities. 
97. PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, PuBLIC AssISTANCE .ALLOWANCES COM· 
PARED WITH THE COST OF LIVING AT MINIMUM STANDARD OF HEALTH AND DECENCY 7 
(1965). Pennsylvania figures for both housing and the cost of living are used simply 
for illustrative purposes. Budget estimates from other areas differ somewhat. 
98. "Approximate maximum" costs are those which are exceeded by only 5% of 
the actual payments for shelter. PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, op. cit. supra 
note 97, at 1. If the cost of fuel and utilities is included in housing costs, as it is in the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency estimate of what low-income families can pay for 
rent, see note 103 infra, then the rent-income ratio for the Pennsylvania family of 
four at subsistence is 32 per cent, instead of 25.7 per cent. Id. at 17. 
March 1967] Slumlordism 895 
If, in the case of a person with a subsistence income, a court is 
going to consider a landlord's assertion that there is no imposition 
because the tenant is free to adjust upward his allocation to shelter, 
it must take notice of the facts in the real world. An appropriate way 
to do so would be to look to the subsistence budget promulgated by 
the local welfare agency or some similar reliable entity. 99 Where the 
tenant is already expending the appropriate maximum for shelter, 
any argument designed to exculpate the landlord on the ground that 
the tenant has "chosen" to spend as little as he has on rent should be 
denied, and the action should be permitted to go forward.100 On the 
other hand, where it can be determined on the basis of such budget 
studies that the tenant is significantly under-allocating to rent, the 
landlord should be permitted to prevail.101 
Obviously, not many prospective plaintiffs will have incomes 
precisely at the subsistence level. A number will be below the 
standard and some will be slightly above it.102 Calculating the maxi-
99. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, is currently planning to 
issue a minimum budget for the major metropolitan areas. Letter from Mrs. Helen H. 
Lamale to Joseph L. Sax, Dec. 13, 1966. 
100. In advancing this suggestion, we are perfectly aware that neither the subsis-
tence line nor the internal allocations of income suggested in such studies are without 
imperfections. Not only do judgments differ as to appropriate averages, but the needs 
of different families also will differ depending on quite individual circumstances-
such as the provision of services gratis by friends or relatives-which are not taken 
into account by the budget studies despite the fact that in many ways such studies 
are quite sophisticated. The question, however, is not whether there is a perfect 
standard, but whether in the absence of perfection there is a workable standard. We 
are convinced that there is. The alternative is either to let every tenant recover, 
regardless of the fact that he may have underallocated to shelter, or to let no tenants 
recover, thus totally ignoring the essence of the economic problems of the very 
poor-the fact that they live at a subsistence level. Since it is the landlord defendant 
who would raise the issue of choice, it would seem only proper that he acquiesce in 
the use of some standard which makes it possible to deal rationally with that issue. 
IOI. In some circumstances there may be a very uneven price progression in 
housing costs, so that, while minimum decent housing costs significantly more than 
the tenant can afford, housing at the next step down the ladder in quality is avail-
able at somewhat less than he can maximally afford. Ku:rN, LET IN THE SUN 34 (1964); 
SI:ERNUEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 70 (1966). Such a tenant may thus be paying 
less than he can afford for his present housing, not because he prefers to underallocate 
to rent, but because any meaningful improvement in his situation would require more 
than he can afford. ·we would permit such a tenant an action, but only if he could 
show that decent housing was not available to him even if he were willing to allocate 
all he could afford. 
102. As income rises significantly above the subsistence level, a family develops 
sufficient discretionary buying power to acquire true consumer choice. We need not 
be concerned about drawing the precise income line at which this qualitative change 
occurs, since the number of families who have true consumer choice and still 
live in seriously substandard housing is almost nil. Thus, as a practical matter, we 
are concerned only with those slightly above the subsistence level, and the test to be 
proposed for them may confidently be applied to all those plaintiffs in indecent 
housing. The possibility that someday a plaintiff will appear with a $30,000 income 
but living in seriously deteriorated housing, can be dealt with when it arises. See note 
165 infra. 
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mum appropriate rent for them requires a very simple adjustment. 
Starting with the maximum appropriate rent for a subsistence family 
in plaintiff's position, one merely need add or subtract a proper 
percentage for each dollar of incremental income above or below the 
subsistence line.103 
2. The Claim That the Tenant Could Have Made 
a Better Bargain 
The slum landlord also should derive no benefit from the citation 
of official housing census figures to the effect that better housing is 
available at prices low-income tenants can afford.104 Rather than 
evidencing the presence of a real choice for the plaintiff and either 
unconcern about or a positive preference for indecent housing, such 
figures demonstrate the treachery of bare statistics. While a good 
many tenants with incomes as low as those in the worst housing live 
in standard dwellings, close examination reveals that they are prin-
cipally small, elderly, white families, many of whom live in rooming 
houses and pay a high proportion of their income for rent so as to 
secure decent housing.105 For the poor working family that is large-
where non-shelter requirements consequently consume a much 
greater portion of income-there is a grave housing shortage;100 
103. Although 20% of income is generally viewed as an appropriate allocation to 
shelter, HHFA, 18th ANN. REP. 19-20 (1964); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64, at 100-01. In 
fact many poor families pay considerably more. AllRAMs, op. cit. supra note 94, at 42. 
There is now some official basis for adopting a 25% figure. H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965). Either figure could properly be adopted for use here. One way 
of implementing the adjustment using the 20% figure would be to add or subtract 
twenty cents for each incremental dollar. For example, assume that the subsistence 
income for a family of plaintiff's size and composition were $3,000, and that the 
appropriate annual rent were $750. If plaintiff's income were $2,500, his appropriate 
rent would be $750, less 20% of the $500 by which his income falls below subsistence, 
or $650; if his income were $3,500, his appropriate rent would be $800. 
Another acceptable means of making this adjustment is to use the median rent-
income ratio for families in the plaintiff's income range. Thus, on the same facts as 
above, if the median family with an income between $2,000 and $3,000 pays 23% of 
its income for shelter, the appropriate rental allocation for a plaintiff with $2,500 
income would be $750 minus 23% of $500. The appropriate rental for a family with 
$3,500 would be $750 plus 23% of $500. 
104. In Philadelphia, for example, 28% of all households have incomes below 
$4,000, yet about -three-fourths of these households live in standard dwellings. 
GREENBERG, CHARACTERISTICS OF Low INCOME AND BADLY HOUSED HOUSEHOLDS IN THE 
PHILADELPHIA REGION 3 (Working Paper No. 8, Phila. Housing Ass'n Policy Comm., 
1964). See also FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PUBUC HOUSING 220-22 (1959). 
105. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 104, at 4-5; NATIONAL CONF. ON LAW AND 
POVERTY, REPORT ON LAW AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (June 23-25, 1965). 
106. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 104, at 4; NATIONAL CoNF. ON LAW AND POVERTY, 
op. cit. supra note 105, at 13 n.37. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 88-93 (1966), 
reports a very high slum vacancy rate in Newark, but does not identify the size of 
units involved. He finds also that this has not forced rents down. 
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where, in addition, the family is non-white, the problem is further 
intensified.107 In Philadelphia, for example, "[if] no household paid 
more than 20 per cent of its income for rent, there would be a gap of 
66,000 between the number of extremely low-income households and 
the number of standard low-rent units in the region's housing 
stock."108 Hence, the mere presence of some standard" low-cost units 
hardly suggests that those who live in substandard housing prefer it; 
rather, the statistics simply indicate that a low-income tenant's oppor-
tunity to procure decent housing is contingent on his family's size, 
composition, and race. In short, the relatively good housing situation 
for little old white ladies living on their pensions does not present a 
choice that can be exercised by a Negro family with a working 
father and a number of growing children. 
Even in those situations where better quality housing is physically 
available in other areas of a city, the problem is a good deal more 
complex than the statistics would make it seem. For unless we are to 
assume that low-income tenants prefer crowded rat-infested dwellings 
to decent housing-which is less than likely-the reason for the slum 
tenant's failure to move to better housing is no help to the landlord. 
For example, a seeming preference to remain in the slums may be 
due to "neighborhood attachment." The preservation of ties which 
people have to their neighborhood, family, and friends are now 
understood to be as essential to the checking of urban blight as is the 
improvement of physical facilities themselves. As one authority as-
tutely observed: 
Unslumming hinges, paradoxically, on the retention of a very con-
siderable part of a slum population within a slum. It hinges on 
whether a considerable number of the residents and businessmen of a 
slum find it both desirable and practical to make and carry out their 
own plans right there, or whether they must virtually all move else-
where.100 
Congress has recently recognized the significance of such factors, and 
has modified the urban renewal process with an important emphasis 
107. NATIONAL CONF. ON LAW AND POVERTY, op. cit. supra note 105, at 13 n.37; NEW 
YORK CITY RENT AND REHABILITATION .ADMINISTRATION, PEOPLE, HOUSING AND RENT 
CONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY 7, 90, 94 (1964); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64, at 81-82. 
108. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 104, at 4. 
109. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 272 (1961). See also 
ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 262-63 (1955); CONNECTICUT .ADVISORY COMM'N, U.S. 
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 26 (1963); FOOTE, Anu-LUGHOD, FOLEY &: "WINNICK, 
HOUSING CHOICES AND HOUSING CONSTRAINTS 123 (1960); GLAZER &: MCENTIRE, STUDIES 
IN HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS 165 (1960); G. &: E. GRIER, EQUALITY AND BEYOND 
36 (1966); HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 144 (1962); Fried, Grieving for a Lost 
Home, in THE URBAN CoNDmON 151 (Duhl. ed. 1963). 
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on conservation and rehabilitation.110 It would be unfortunate indeed 
for the courts to make a tenant's claim tum on his willingness to 
repudiate the very values that the rest of government is now striving 
to preserve. 
Even more obvious than "neighborhood attachment" is the re-
striction on mobility imposed by racial discrimination which sub-
stantially confines non-whites-who bulk large in the ranks of the 
poor111-to the ghettos where the worst housing is concentrated.112 
Language problems and consumer ignorance also work to restrict the 
mobility of poor people.113 These are factors which negate the seem-
ing ability of the poor to go elsewhere and participate in that great 
satistical bounty of decent housing. What a cruel hoax it would be 
to deny a remedy on the theory that such theoretically available 
better housing proves the slum tenant's freely expressed preference 
for his dilapidated cold water flat. 
To the extent that a landlord might be able to show the avail-
ability of some better apartments not subject to any of the foregoing 
objections-that is, apartments of equal spaciousness within the 
neighborhood and with no racial impediments to their availability-
such evidence, rather than serving as a defense, would seem to inten-
sify his culpability. For he would thereby demonstrate that he was 
giving even less housing for the money than were his competitors. 
Insofar as such conditions exist, they would appear to prove precisely 
the opposite of what the landlord is trying to show, which is that he 
is simply operating in a free market situation. Such market imper-
fections suggest that shortages are so intense that the equalizing 
effects of competition have broken down, that he is taking advantage 
of ignorance produced by widespread lack of market information due 
to an absence of advertising, or that he is taking advantage of ignor-
110. H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 27 (1965); Stein, The Housing Act 
of 1964: Urban Renewal, 11 N.YL.F. 1, 12·13 (1965); Note, Enforcement of Municipal 
Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 803 (1965); Comment, Conservation and Re• 
habilitation of Housing: An Idea Approaches Adolescence, 63 MICH. L. REv. 892 (1965); 
Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing 
Supply, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 180 (1963). 
111. ABRAMS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 26; HARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 109, at 
61-81; HOUSING AND Ho11rn FINANCE AGENCY, OUR NONWHITE POPULATION 36-37 (1963); 
NATIONAL CONF. ON LAW AND POVERTY, op. cit. supra note 105, at 20; NEW YORK CITY 
RENT AND REHABIUTATION ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 107, at 95. 
112. FooTE, .ABu-LUGHOD, FOLEY &: WINNICK, op. cit. supra note 109, at 126; GOLD· 
BLATT, NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COST AND QUAUTY OF 
HOUSING IN WHITE AND NEGRO AREAs OF NEW YORK CITY 3 (1960); MENDELSON, DISCRIMI• 
NATION 115-16 (1962): Weaver, Major Factors in Urban Planning, in THE URBAN CoN• 
DITION 102-03 (Duhl. ed. 1963). 
113. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 49 n.l (1963); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CoN· 
SUMER INTEREST, THE MoST FOR THEIR MONEY 7 (1965); Richards, Consumer Practices 
of the Poor, in Low INCOME LIFE STYLES 74 (Irelan ed. 1966). 
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ance or language barriers common to the immigrant groups that so 
heavily populate slum areas.114 Whatever the specific explanation in 
a given case, these factors show precisely what the tenant needs to 
show to make his case: that his situation is not the product of any 
informed market choice among available alternatives. 
Finally, it must be noted that the essentially monopolistic situa-
tion is not abated by any rush into this lucrative market of new 
entrants who would, by increasing the supply, reduce severe shortages 
and thus either force prices down or push quality up. For, unlike a 
classical situation of excess demand, this market is a tightly restricted 
one. The poverty of the consumers imposes quite low ceilings on the 
rents which can be paid. Thus entry to the market is limited to those 
who can afford to provide additional housing for the low-cost market 
at a capital outlay small enough to permit the potential rentals to be 
profitable. But it is precisely the gap between the costs of building or 
buying housing for the poor and the potential return on such invest-
ment that has prevented the building of new private housing for the 
poor115 and, along with racial restrictions and existing shortages in 
moderate-income housing, has made the filtration process-the con-
version of older, moderately-priced housing into low-cost housing-
extremely slow and utterly inadequate.116 These facts, added to the 
unwillingness of legislatures thus far to fill the gap with enough 
public housing, have continued to assure the ability of the slum land-
lord to impose indecent housing on the poor on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. 
3. The Absence of a Desire To Do Harm as a Defense 
Another formal sense in which the slum dwelling situation differs 
from the usual case is that here the landlord has no intent-
in the sense of desire-to harm the plaintiff. His only interest is an 
economic one, and the damage incurred by the plaintiff may be 
viewed by him not only as undesired, but also as unfortunate and 
regrettable. The Restatement, on its face, would seem to give some 
credence to this distinction, for its definition of the intentional 
infliction tort requires the defendant to have intended that emo-
tional harm be the consequence of his act.117 The illustrative 
114. GLAZER 8: MCENTIRE, op. cit. supra note 109, at 168. 
115. See notes 20 8: llO supra. 
ll6. HHFA, 16TH ANN. REP. 18 (1962); MEYERSON, TERREIT 8: WHEATON, HOUSING 
P.EOPLE AND Cm.Es 10 (1962); W.EAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 50-51 (1964). 
117. "The rule ••• creates liability only where the actor intends to invade the 
interest in freedom from severe emotional distress." REsTATEMENT (S.ECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 47 comment a at 80 (1965). 
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example is that of a defendant who shoots at the plaintiff's dog in 
order to terminate its annoying barking.118 It is said that no action 
would lie on these facts. Apparently the point is that it would have 
been a much more serious and outrageous act if the defendant's 
purpose had been to torment the plaintiff, whom he knew to be 
deeply attached to the dog.119 
Such a distinction merely suggests that a desire to inflict pain 
on the plaintiff may make an act much more culpable than it would 
have been absent that motive. But the example hardly proves that 
an act cannot be outrageous in the absence of such a motive. For 
example, if a foster parent were to starve his ward simply in order 
to save money, without having any enmity at all toward the child 
thus abused, we think it would be readily agreed that the act was 
outrageous. Or, to take an example closer to that of the Restatement, 
if, with perfect good will toward all concerned, one were to murder 
a neighbor's child in order to quell nocturnal crying which disturbed 
his sleep, it would hardly be thought odd to characterize the act 
as outrageous.120 Though it would no doubt be worse to have starved 
or murdered the hypothetical child for purely sadistic reasons, it 
seems not at all unreasonable to suggest that an economic motiva-
tion is quite monstrous enough to earn the epithet "outrageous." 
4. The "But For" Test as a Defense 
The problem of causation, although implicitly considered al-
ready, perhaps deserves another word. Because there are always a 
variety of sellers in the market, the landlord may very well seek to play 
the old "but for" game. Since housing is essential, and since the low-
cost housing offered by all sellers may be essentially the same, it might 
be argued that, "but for" the landlord's act, the tenant would have 
found himself in deplorable housing anyway. While we would be 
pleased to see such a claim made since it would aid the monopolistic, 
captive market analysis made above, it does not help the landlord 
even in the causation context. It is, of course, settled beyond cavil in 
118. Ibid. 
119. See id. § 46 comment f, illus. 11, at '76. 
120. The precise position of the Restatement as to such a case is unclear; it may 
be willing to impose liability where the defendant can be held to know that serious 
harm of a kind which he did not intend is likely to occur. Id. § 46 comment l. If this 
is what is meant, and if the Restatement is not merely adopting the view that one 
who murders a husband in the presence of the wife also wants to hurt the wife, then 
the Restatement position is consistent with that urged here insofar as the question 
of desire to do harm to the plaintiff is concerned. Insofar as the Restatement requires 
the nature of the harm to be "severe mental distress," as indicated earlier, we believe 
that such a limited view must be revised. 
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the law of torts that where two defendants each act upon the plaintiff 
simultaneously, causing him injury, neither may exculpate himself 
by urging that, "but for" his act, the injury would have come about 
anyway.121 The obvious reason for such a rule is that otherwise each 
wrongdoer would be able to point the finger of blame at the other, 
with the absurd result that each would go free and the plaintiff, who 
suffers under the fortuity that he was twice wronged, would go with-
out remedy. A fortiori, where the defendant was the sole cause, the 
analysis is equally applicable. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE CULPABLE TENANT 
Slum landlords are the evil that produce the ghetto. 
-A Harlem Tenant.122 
There's really no such thing as a slum landlord-only slum tenants. 
-A Chicago Landlord.123 
These statements indicate more than naked self-interest on the 
part of landlords who rent, and tenants who inhabit, slum housing. 
Outside observers too have subscribed to these Manichaean positions 
which attribute the etiology of slums solely to landlords or to the 
poor. Those who blame the poor for their own plight are perhaps 
compelled to do so for the reason explained by Nathan Straus: 
I know that the people who live in the slums are human beings 
like my own mother, father, brothers, sisters, like my own children. 
Since this is the case, it is unbearable to me that they should be 
forced to live in unhealthful and disease-breeding surroundings. The 
idea is revolting, and doubly so because I am a part of the society 
which tolerates these conditions. The sense of guilt which I would 
feel were I to admit that the misery of these human beings is a 
responsibility of mine would be more than I could endure. . • • 
Rather it must be the responsibility of the families who live in these 
bad surroundings. Yes, that is the solution of my own inner conflict.124 
Conversely, those who put all blame upon the landlords may be in-
fluenced by a view of the poor as "The Proletariat" who have a class 
morality and can do no wrong.125 
Tragically, there is truth to both positions, for poverty is a culture 
121. PROSSER, TOR'IS § 41, at 242-45 (3d ed. 1964). This sort of defense has also been 
rejected in pollution cases. E.g., People ex rel. Stream Control Comm'n v. Port Huron, 
!105 Mich. 153, 157, 9 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1943). 
122. Sign at a demonstration protesting housing conditions in East Harlem. N.Y. 
Times, May 31, 1964, p. 45, col. 4. 
123. Satter, West Side Story, The New Republic, July 2, 1966, p. 15, 16. 
124. STRAUS, THE SEVEN MYTIIS OF HOUSING 146 (1944). 
125. Moynihan, Three Problems in Combatting Poverty, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 41, 
50 (Gordon ed. 1965). 
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that perpetuates itself.126 The slum landlords contribute to the exis-
tence of poverty, but the poor themselves are also both a cause and an 
effect of poverty. Consequently, any practical solution to the problem 
must come to grips with both of these facts. Proposals to help correct 
indecent housing should not "ask of the poor that they get up and 
act just like everyone else in the society" any more than one should 
"demand of cripples that they run races."127 But neither should courts 
treat the poor patemalistically, thereby conferring upon them an 
additional status of inferiority. Instead, a showing of responsibility 
must be required of slum tenants and at the same time some incen-
tive must be provided for the assumption of that responsibility. The 
following comments are designed to articulate standards, within the 
context of the civil damage action, to meet this need. 
First, one must be careful to note that, while slum dwellings with 
television antennae on _the roofs, automatic washers and dryers inside, 
and automobiles outside may indicate an irresponsible tenant, they 
may also indicate a budget-minded tenant who finds installment 
payments on the washer and dryer cheaper than regular visits to the 
laundromat;128 or a responsible parent who desires to supervise her 
children while doing household tasks and thus provides them 
with inexpensive and popular entertainment in the form of tele-
vision.129 An automobile may represent a quite rational investment 
for one who lives far from his job and lacks adequate public trans-
portation. Other seemingly needless possessions may point to a tenant 
who was the victim of an unscrupulous merchant,130 or may represent 
a form of "compensatory consumption,"131 fulfilling a need which 
does not even exist for other groups in the society. Thus Millspaugh 
describes the popularity of large colorful automobiles as 
a symptom of the slum dwellers desire for escape. "Staying at home, 
you're always reminded of the conditions you live in," said [a Balti-
more housing inspector], "so you have an automobile to drive around 
to another part of town. Even if you merely go to visit friends in 
another slum, it isn't yours."132 
The very poor live in a milieu that is in many ways as far removed 
from us as is the agrarian society of eighteenth century America, and 
126. HARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 109, at 141; Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 
Scientific American, Oct. 1966, p. 19, 21. 
127. HARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 109, at 138. 
128. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoRE 38 (1963); Richards, supra note 113, at 71. 
129. CAFLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoRE 37 (1963). 
130. Id. at 16, 25, 29; Mn.I.SPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, op. cit. supra note 9!1, at 9-11; 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1966, p. 1, col. 8. 
131. CAPwvrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 13 (196!1). 
132. MILLSPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, op. cit. supra note 9!1, at 24. 
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just as the law has, in recognition of the change from eighteenth cen-
tury society, modified its concept of such things as the "reasonable 
man,"133 so we in this context must recognize that "what is objective 
reason on one [environment] is unreason ... on another."134 
This point is rather forcefully demonstrated in a recent study 
supported by the National Institute of Mental Health.135 A mother 
who kept her children home from school was found not to be uncon-
cerned about education or truancy, but rather to be embarrassed to 
send the children to school hungry at a time when there was no food 
in the house.136 One researcher concluded: 
[M]any seemingly clear cases of child neglect were actually a means 
of independence training. Some mothers, [it was found,] seem to 
withhold affection not because they reject their children but because 
they want to train the children away from dependency on them. They 
have to get each child "out of the way" as soon as possible in order 
to go on to the next child.131 
A jobless husband, discouraged after unsuccessfully making the 
rounds, stole a radio to get some money. He was arrested and placed 
on probation, but he said that he would steal again if he was faced 
with the same circumstances. "Then his voice trailed off in anger: 
'You have to do something .... I mean, when you're home and your 
child asks for a piece of bread, and you [can't] give it to him ... .' "138 
The television set or automobile is thus no more an obvious sign 
of irresponsibility than it is a symbol of virtue or reason. To identify 
and evaluate the meaning of consumer behavior in each particular 
instance is a perfectly hopeless task, but for the purpose of devising a 
workable judicial rule there would seem to be a sensible way out of 
the dilemma. Where a tenant's expenditures are such that he is 
paying less for shelter than is reasonable for his family as 
determined by the rent-income ratio,139 we would allow the landlord 
a defense to the action, however rational the under-allocation may be 
1!13. PROSSER, ToRTs § !13, at 170 (!Id ed. 1964). 
1!14. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH 29 (1957). Thus, as Brecht's 
St. Joan said, it may be "[n]ot the wickedness of the poor have you shown me, 
but the poverty of the poor.'' Saint Joan of the Stockyards, in SEVEN PLAYS OF BERTOLB 
BRECHT 178 (Bentley ed. 1961). See also Low INCOME LIFE STYLES (Irelan ed. 1966); 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966, p. E-5, col. 1-!1. 
1!15. POVERTY'S CHILDREN, A STUDY BY COMMUNICATING REsEARCH ON THE URBAN 
POOR, sponsored by THE HEALTH AND WELFARE COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 
AREA. (1966). 
1!16. Id. at 11. 
1!17. Id. at 17. 
1!18. Id. at 15. 
1!19. For an explanation of how this figure is calculated, see notes 94-10!1 supra 
and accompanying text. 
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from the tenant's point of view. On the other hand, where the maxi-
mum, or more, is being expended on shelter, we would hold the 
landlord liable, however irrational other expenditures might seem, 
on the ground that, as to the landlord, the tenant is acting rationally. 
The fact that a tenant may be depriving his family of food to indulge 
his passion for the racetrack ought not to affect the landlord's obliga-
tions any more than would the fact that the tenant might beat his wife 
or fall asleep on the job. Only where tenant conduct goes to the 
ability of the landlord to fulfill his specific obligation may such a 
defense properly be raised. 
The foregoing proposal for synthesizing economic relations be-
tween tenant conduct and landlord defenses suggests in addition an 
appropriate solution for those situations where it is urged that the 
deteriorated condition of slum housing should be attributed to the 
tenants, rather than to the landlord. Where the conditions upon 
which a finding of indecency is predicated are attributable to tenant 
conduct, rather than merely to landlord neglect, we believe a defense 
should be available. For example, if, despite the landlord's effort to 
make repairs in the plumbing, tenants continue to misuse the facili-
ties, causing repeated breakdowns after such repairs, we would not 
hold a landlord liable for finally giving up the effort. Similarly, if, 
despite the supplying of adequate refuse collection facilities, tenants 
continue to throw garbage in hallways and alleys, we would exculpate 
the landlord. On the other hand, where the landlord can point to no 
such mitigating circumstances, the action should lie. 
Technically, this is what the law has always been, even in the con-
text of code enforcement. But, in fact, the presence of tenant wrong-
doing has either been ignored or has served to dilute the rigor with 
which the codes have been enforced. We propose that the question of 
tenant culpability be taken very seriously indeed, although we are 
perfectly aware that such an approach is more easily proposed than 
implemented. Not only are there difficult problems of proof to be 
apprehended, but the presence of many tenants who have experi-
enced little else but slum conditions, and the mores which those 
"conditions create, suggests an organizational challenge of consider-
able proportions. 
We nonetheless urge that the challenge be undertaken, not 
because of any desire to make the tenant's opportunity to recover 
more difficult, but out of conviction that essentially it is not help, but 
self-help (made meaningful by opportunity), that is needed. The 
traditional neighborhood improvement program, initiated from the 
outside, has often failed not because it did not result in some physical 
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improvement, but because it was carried out without effecting any 
internal changes in the people involved.140 Paternalism of this sort, 
presupposing the inadequacy of its beneficiaries, perpetuates the very 
inequality sought to be overcome.141 Thus it is that one reads of the 
effect of welfare programs: 
Escape from poverty is not easy for American children raised in 
families accustomed to living on relief. A recent sample study of 
AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] recipients found 
that more than 40 percent of the parents were themselves raised in 
homes where public assistance had been received.142 
In place of an image of inferiority externally imposed upon the 
poor which then becomes self-fulfilling, the poor themselves must 
"undertake social action that redefines them as potentially worth-
while and individually more powerful."143 This requires not only 
that the poor be organized, but that the process of organization, if it 
is to transform the "strength of the poor into the power of the 
poor,"144 must come from the poor themselves.145 
This notion, that the potential for self-reliance has meaning only 
if it is at some point transformed into power, into action which affects 
the lives of those involved, is what ties the overall social problem into 
the legal remedy sought here. For, just as welfare dispensed as a dole 
from without is itself insufficient, so mere intellectual or spiritual 
changes in self-image alone are meaningless unless at some point they 
come to fruition in the form of results responsive to the needs of the 
tenants.146 The proposed civil damage action thus not only demands 
much from slum inhabitants, but also holds out to them the concrete 
promise of measurable social betterment because it aims "at the 
140. Haagstrom, The Power of the Poor, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 315, 325 (Ferman, 
Kornbluh & Haber eds. 1965). 
141. Id. at 326; .ALINsKY, R.EvEn.LE FOR. RADICALS 68 (1946); Briar, Welfare From 
Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 370, 384 
(1966). 
142. H. COMM, ON EDUC, AND LABOR., 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATFS 15 (Comm. Print 1964). 
143. Haagstrom, supra note 140, at 332. 
144. Reisman, Low Income Culture: The Strengths of the Poor, 26 J. OF MAR.R.IAGE 
AND THE FAMILY 417 (1964). 
145. Haagstrom, supra note 140, at 332. Lest it be thought that we are disregard-
ing our own advice by telling the poor what they need, we abjure all claim to 
originality and point, as an example, to the definition of Black Power given by its 
proponents: Control by the affected group over that upon which they are dependent. 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1966, p. 10, cols. 2-8; Sanders, The Language of Watts, 201 
THE NATION 490-93 (1965). 
146. Coles, The Poor Don't Want To Be Middle Class, in CALIF. STATE DEP'T OF 
SOCIAL WELFARE, SELECTIVE READING SERIES No. 7, at 8 (1965); Haagstrom, supra note 
140, at 332. 
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destruction of slums, their causes and effects;"147 it is an appropriate 
remedy because its "goal [is] genuine self-help, not pierely self-im-
provement."148 
IV. SETTING THE STANDARD 
Setting the standard of unlawful conduct requires the identifica-
tion of those housing conditions so at odds with our concept of the 
essential decencies of life that we believe no American ought to be 
subjected to them at the hands of another. Naturally there are no 
absolutely fixed stars in this constellation. Many writers have noted 
that, in different places and at different times, the notions of minimal 
decencies have been widely divergent;149 thus it may be pointed out 
not only that in some places people live with placidity, if not en-
thusiastic fervor, in thatch huts, but also that even in the United 
States indoor plumbing is rather a recent innovation. While this is 
indisputable, the lesson which is meant to be drawn therefrom is 
unclear. It is equally true that the abolition of human slavery is a 
relatively modem innovation, here as elsewhere, but today we would 
hardly need the thirteenth amendment to persuade us that involun-
tary servitude is an outrage intolerable in our present society. The 
question is not whether our standards have timelessness and univer-
sality, but simply what our standards are. We are hardly less capable 
of asking ourselves what the outer limits on landlord conduct should 
be than we are of asking that question with respect to bill collectors, 
undertakers, policemen, or voting registrars. 
While we have neither the benefits of a written constitution nor 
the usual historical precedents to guide us, we are by no means left 
wholly at large. Fortunately, the widespread adoption of housing 
codes by American cities150 provides an excellent starting point in 
formulating a standard. Their identification of various housing con-
ditions as unacceptable and illegal serves us both in the sense that it 
puts any landlord on notice of the kind of conduct which may be 
challenged, and in that it represents a legislative judgment as to the 
points at which economic preservation of the landlord is deemed to 
be outweighed by concern for the living conditions of the tenant. At 
the same time, the housing codes quite clearly bring together a great 
. 147. Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 
in POVERTY IN AMERICA 457,462 (Ferman, Kombluh & Haber eds. 1965). 
148. Ibid. 
149. E.g., BANFIELD & GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AREA$ 
78 (1958); FISHER, 20 YEARS OF PUBUC HOUSING 29-31, 52-53 (1959). 
150. 27 MUNICIPAL YEAR BooK 318-28 (1960); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal 
Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 803 (1965). 
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variety of violations of widely differing importance, including not 
only the very grave wrongs but also a good many quite minor in-
fractions.151 While it would be a serious mistake to treat every viola-
tion of the housing codes as a tort for which substantial damages 
ought to lie, the housing codes do serve the important function of 
delineating the outer limits of wrongful conduct. Thus it may be 
said, as a first step, that no act which is not a violation of the housing 
code may be tortious. 
This first step circumscribes the scope of our inquiry. The second 
step requires selecting from the codes those violations which are of 
sufficient gravity that failure to comply with them can be viewed as 
outrageous and thus tortious. At this point, too, we have considerable 
guidance; for a great number of studies of housing conditions, from 
the Census surveys to investigations by governmental agencies, private 
institutions, and individuals, despite their divergences on many 
issues, are quite consistent in identifying those basic conditions which 
reduce a dwelling to the level of indecency. These conditions are: 
I. Structural Dilapidation: This is usually understood to include 
substantial openings, decay, listing, or sagging in foundations, walls, 
ceilings, stairways, halls, and floors of such a nature as to present a 
serious danger of injury or exposure. It also covers structures which 
by their nature are unfit for human habitation, such as huts or shacks 
made of scrap, with dirt floors or without foundations.152 
2. Absence or Inadequacy of Basic Facilities: This means the 
absence of hot and cold running water, flush toilet, and bath or 
shower within each unit for the exclusive use of the occupants 
thereof.153 It includes, notwithstanding the presence of such facilities 
and basic heating, cooking, and electrical apparatus, the maintenance 
of these facilities and devices in a condition such that they cannot be 
151. In addition to the customary provisions requiring the presence of basic facilities 
such as toilets, plumbing, and heating, one may find a requirement that apartment 
elevators contain a sign stating the rated carrying capacity, or that bathrooms must be 
accessible from any sleeping room without passing through any other sleeping room. 
Such typical variety is illustrated by the NEW YoRK STATE MODEL HousING CoDE 
§§ A·207-2b, A-513b (Division of Housing and Community Renewal 1960). 
152. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS' MODEL MINIMUM HOUSING 
STANDARDS ORDINANCE § 12-606 (1962) [hereinafter cited as NIMLO HOUSING ORDINANCE]; 
SIEGEL &: BROOKS, SLUM PREVENTION THROUGH CONSERVATION AND REHABILITATION 98 
(1953); U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING 1960, vol. 1, States and Small Areas, Part 6 XXI-XXII. 
153. NIMLO HOUSING ORDINANCE § 12-603; NEW YORK CITY RENT AND REHABILITA-
TION ADMINIS'I'RATION, op. cit. supra note 107, at 29; SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL IN-
SECURITY 31, 123 (U.S. Dep't H.E.W., Social Security Admin., Div. of Research and 
Statistics Research Report No. 1, 1963); SIEGEL &: BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 152, at 19. 
In some circumstances, the sharing of a bathroom by tenants in quite small units may 
be permissible. E.g., CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 78-13.1, .4. 
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depended upon to give adequate service on a regular basis.154 A heat-
ing plant or plumbing facility which is so old or deteriorated that it is 
incessantly breaking down, leaving the tenants without service for 
substantial or frequent periods, would exemplify such an inadequacy. 
3. Absence of Rudimentary Sanitary Services: This means prin-
cipally infestation of vermin or rodents, accumulation of filth in 
common areas, or failure to provide adequate facilities for the dis-
posal of trash and garbage.155 
4. Severe Crowding: Overcrowding is usually measured in mathe-
matical terms, on the basis either of persons per room,156 or of cubic 
feet of air and floor space per individual.157 While these standards are 
undoubtedly useful in general, they ought not to be employed with 
unbending rigor. Obviously a room-person ratio is less than fully 
helpful unless the size and nature of the rooms are taken into account. 
Similarly, a space-person ratio would undoubtedly be subject to some 
marginal diminution as family size increases; a six-person family 
probably does not need fifty per cent more space than does a four-
person family in order to be equally uncrowded. Underlying each of 
these tests is an attempt to determine both the limits of healthful and 
sanitary living and the minimum amenities of privacy. Thus, in addi-
tion to the numerical criteria, it would be relevant to determine 
whether bathroom and kitchen facilities are contained within the 
same room, whether there are sleeping quarters for adults separate 
from those for children, and whether there is some room in the 
dwelling not required as a sleeping room which permits opportunity 
for privacy anu study. 
One further comment is required as to the problem of over-
crowding. Conceivably a defendant landlord would argue that over-
crowding, unlike failure to provide services, does not represent a 
profit-motivated imposition in that he may have a fixed price for a 
given apartment and is indifferent whether that apartment is 
occupied by two or twenty people. Indeed, he may urge that he 
would rather have it occupied by a smaller family, for crowding is 
undesirable to him in that it puts further strain on his building's 
facilities without producing any additional rental income. Such a 
defense suggests its own rebuttal: If rents are not determined by 
154. Ibid. 
155. NIMLO HousING ORDINANCE § 12-603; N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 2. 
156. NEW YORK CITY RENT AND REHABn.rrATION .ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 
107, at 6; SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 153, at 122-23. 
157. Wall, Developments in Municipal Housing Codes, 42 Ptrauc MANAGEMENT 
107-08 (1960); see, e.g., CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE§ 78-16.l; NIMLO HOUSING ORDINANCE 
§§ 12-604, -605; NEW YORK STATE MODEL HOUSING CoDE § A-203; SIEGEL 8: BROOKS, 
op. cit. supra note 152, at 19. 
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density of occupation, why do slum landlords rent very small apart-
ments to very large families? The answer is that this is the only 
market, by and large, which they can serve. Small low-income families 
do not face anything like the critical shortage facing the large 
poor family; 158 the small family can frequently satisfy its housing 
needs in standard, or only mildly substandard, dwellings.159 That 
they do not provide the principal market for seriously sub-
standard housing is demonstrated by the extremely high correlation 
between severely run-down housing and severe overcrowding.160 
Thus, for the owner of very bad housing, the choice is between 
vacancies and overcrowding. Because he chooses to acquiesce in over-
crowding, his decision is profit motivated just as surely as is his failure 
to make necessary repairs.161 To note that he faces the prospect of 
vacancies does not, however, suggest that he also faces a situation of 
excess supply which would diminish his essentially monopolistic 
position, the relevance of which was discussed above;162 for, although 
he may operate principally in the limited large-family low-income 
market, the supply of housing for this restricted group is critically 
short. Consequently the slum landlord who permits overcrowding 
may fairly be viewed as just as culpable, in the sense of making a 
profit-motivated decision which is imposed upon consumers in an 
intense shortage situation, as is the landlord who refuses to install 
or repair basic facilities. 
While the four basic wrongs just delineated should be viewed as 
neither exhaustive nor precisely descriptive, they are at least as suffi-
cient as the tests used in determining the reasonableness of deten-
tion in a false imprisonment case, 163 or the outrageousness of a bill 
collector's tactics.164 Moreover, the individual standards are mutually 
158. COMMUNITY RENEWAL PROGRAM, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK'S RENEWAL 
STRATEGY/1965, at 36 (1965). 
159. GREENBERG, CHARACTElUSTICS OF Low INCOME AND BADLY HOUSED HOUSEHOLDS 
IN THE PHILADELPHIA REGION 6 (Working Paper No. 8, Phila. Housing Ass'n Policy 
Comm., May 1964). 
160. GLAZER &: McENTIRE, Snroms IN HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS 158-59 (1960); 
MEYERSON, TERRE'IT &: WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE AND CITIES 58 (1962); NEW YORK 
CITY SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON HOUSING STA11STICS, MAYOR'S HOUSING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 
HOUSING 5TA11STICS HANDBOOK 35 (Oct. 1964); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 153, at 85-86. 
161. GLAZER &: McENTIRE, op. cit. supra note 160, at 168, 173. Though codes may 
impose responsibility for overcrowding on both landlords and tenants, e.g., CHICAGO 
MUNICIPAL CoDE §§ 78-13, -16, where tenant overcrowding is the involuntary product 
of economic necessity, cf. notes 94-ll6 supra and accompanying text, no legal disability 
ought to follow for the tenant. Conversely, a landlord defense may be available where 
the tenant is subletting to strangers for a profit. 
162. See notes 104-15 supra and accompanying text. 
163. PROSSER, TORTS § 22, at 124 (3d ed. 1964). 
164. Id. § II, at 49-50. 
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reinforcing because dilapidated buildings will also generally be those 
without rudimentary facilities or services. In this sense, too, the cases 
may be expected to resemble the bill collector situation, where it is 
the cumulative impact of a variety of undesirable practices taken 
together that persuades a court that an actionable wrong has 
occurred.166 
Moreover, we can be reasonably confident that truly deplorable 
housing will be sufficiently shocking to the sensibilities of judges and 
juries that they will recognize indecency when they see it,166 and that, 
in the words of the Restatement, "recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse his resentment 
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' "167 Such 
confidence is enhanced by the word pictures so often given by those 
who write about the slums. Of the many such examples available, 
perhaps a single illustration will suffice to indicate the impact to be 
expected on the average member of the community: 
In this six-story building, converted into furnished rooms, filth 
prevails throughout-filled garbage cans without covers line the hall-
ways with the surplus refuse spilling over; roaches and rats abound; 
broken flooring, plumbing, windows, lighting fixtures and plaster 
are observable throughout .... One community kitchen is used by 
seven families. Twelve toilets are intermittently in service on six 
floors . . . . This is the abode of thirty families and 105 chil-
dren .... 1as 
It is for subjection to such conditions that relief is sought. Of 
course, as has been made clear,169 it is only the imposition of these 
conditions by the landlord which is to be redressed, and an appro-
priate showing of non-culpability by the plaintiff tenants will be 
required. Moreover, there is no desire to reach the merely inadvertant 
landlord whose facilities are out of repair but who has not had ade-
quate notice or a proper opportunity to respond to complaints. While 
notice, actual or constructive knowledge, and opportunity are thus all 
elements of the wrong, it seems appropriate to let the precise nature 
165. E.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W .2d 64 (1954) (persistent 
course of harrassment by bill collector). Occasionally a building will lack one very vital 
facility. Nonetheless, unless the building as a whole is one in which living conditions 
are indecent as one commonly uses that term in describing the more egregious slum 
conditions, no cause of action should be recognized. For example, tenants of a middle 
income apartmentthouse which lacks a fire escape, though it is otherwise quite a 
pleasant place to live, would not be able to sue under this proposal. 
166. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
167. REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d at 73 (1965). 
168. SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 153, at 123-24. 
169. See sections II &: Ill supra. 
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of the proof which is required of these elements be resolved within 
the factual situation of a given case. 
V. MEASURING THE WRONG: WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
ARlsES AND THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES 
Because the kind of conduct at issue here produces consequences 
which are both long-term and difficult to discern, and which reveal 
their meaning only in a milieu which contains many actors and many 
victims, the cause of action cannot be said to arise when the wrongful 
conduct is completed, as it would in the conventional case. Rather, 
as in the constitutional or antitrust merger cases, it is the initial act 
which sets the law in motion. Only in this way can the wrong be 
remedied before the very thing which the law seeks to prevent has 
occurred. Thus it is the act of renting or of maintaining indecent 
housing which gives rise to the right of redress.170 
Lest it be thought that this approach unjustifiably opens the way 
for people to buy themselves a lawsuit for the price of a month's rent, 
let it be remembered who the potential plaintiffs in such lawsuits are: 
They are people who are expending the maximum feasible portion of 
their income on rent and who still find themselves living in deplor-
ably bad housing. They are thus the very poor who, for all the reasons 
discussed earlier, are simply the takers of what they can get. The 
whole point of this article is that, where all they can get is indecent 
housing, they are entitled to get a lawsuit along with it.171 
Nor should it be a cause for concern that a particular individual 
could conceivably be a plaintiff in more than one lawsuit against 
various defendants who have been his landlords at different times. 
While this is hardly likely to be a problem of significant proportion 
in light of the organizational demands imposed by our view of the 
tenant culpability defense,172 the possibility of multiple lawsuits, far 
from being an obstacle, is perfectly consistent with the underlying 
theory of this article. For, as the earlier discussion shows, it is the 
170. This is not intended to contravene the earlier statements that tenant recovery 
depends upon a showing of adequate knowledge and notice, and that recovery may be 
had only when the tenants have not caused ,the harm. To get to this stage will some-
times require the passage of a period of time after the start of the tenancy. The only 
point sought to be made here is that the arising of the cause of action should not 
depend upon the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate the presence of traditional tort type 
damage. This is merely to put in a technical context the point made in section II supra. 
171. The Supreme Court has before it this term a related issue. In Pierson v. Ray, 
ll52 F.2d 2lll (5th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 938 (1966), the question is whether 
persons on a civil rights pilgrimage who invite and endure arrest, are barred from 
subsequently maintaining a Civil Rights Act damage action. See also West Park Ave., 
Inc. v. Ocean Township, 48 N.J. 122,224 A.2d 1 (1966). 
172. See text accompanying notes 139-48 supra. 
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parallel conduct of landlords in the market available to the tenant 
which makes the slum-housing problem so serious; it is the totality of 
conduct of all the enterprisers which puts the tenant in his unfortu-
nate position, just as in the antitrust or racial discrimination context 
it is the pattern of conduct in the industry or community which com-
prises the total fabric of wrongfulness. Each landlord who, when 
given the chance, imposes intolerable living conditions contrib-
utes something to the gravity of the damage inflicted on his tenant. 
Therefore, the fact that a tenant could bring suits against more than 
one landlord would expedite the remedying of the totality of wrong-
fulness which operates against the tenant. 
This is simply another way of saying that one should not view the 
right to be free from subjection to indecent housing as a monolithic 
right which can be infringed but once by a single person; it is rather 
a right to be free of such treatment by all potential violators, and 
the magnitude of potential damage is as large as the class of potential 
violators. That inchoate right in all its multiplicity is infringed as 
often as the wrongful practices occur. Such an approach is most com-
monly found in the racial discrimination area, where civil damages 
are recoverable for each violation of a public accommodation law. It 
is perfectly possible for an individual to seek service at various times 
in various restaurants or hotels and to recover damages for each 
refusal.173 Because the degree of harmfulness of discrimination is 
proportional to the prevalence of discriminatory conduct in the 
community, each instance is viewed as a separate wrong to be 
remedied separately. The right is not exhausted by a single act of 
exclusion. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that the damages to be re-
covered in such a case, as in the ordinary intentional infliction liti-
gation, contain substantial deterrent, as well as punitive and vindi-
catory, elements. From this perspective, attention is properly focused 
on the fact that various defendants, each of whom needs to be re-
minded forcibly that his conduct will not be tolerated, are being 
given the sort of treatment they deserve. That one plaintiff may reap 
the economic benefits of.this educational lesson to the landlords need 
not deter us here any more than it does in any of the various situa-
tions where punitive damages are granted or where the promotion of 
justice is entrusted to private vindicators of the public interest.174 
The theoretical prospect that multiple suits would lead to the vast 
enrichment of certain former slum tenants is sufficiently remote that 
it need hardly worry us. Such fears are perhaps best likened to the 
173. E.g., N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW§ 41. 
174. E.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545-56 (1943). 
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complaint that "discrimination in reverse" is permitting the Negroes 
to take over the country, but none of whose proponents has yet 
yearned to become a Negro and get in on the great bonanza. 
As to the measure of damages, it is of course clear that here-as in 
a voting rights case-there is no economic interest as such at stake. 
Since the damages serve a significant deterrent and punitive func-
tion, it might be appropriate to follow the rule of Alcorn v. Mitch-
ell,175 where the court, in affirming an award of $1,000, looked at the 
wealth of the defendant and asked whether the damages granted 
would make clear to the defendant that gratifying his malignant 
instincts was a painfully costly enterprise. Another possibility, and 
one more attuned to the remedial aspects of the case, would be to 
grant the plaintiff some multiple of the amount needed to purchase 
standard housing for his family for a year. Since the gravamen of 
defendant's wrong is subjection of the plaintiff to the disabilities 
attendant upon living in substandard housing, it would seem just 
to require the defendant to enable the plaintiff to obtain the bene-
fits of standard housing for some period of time, perhaps five years. 
This approach has a further appeal: Since the prospect of contract-
ing the low-cost housing supply has been a serious impediment 
to effective code enforcement, nothing could be more appropriate 
than to have the guilty landlord himself mitigate this problem.176 
During this period, it must be expected that legislatures, spurred 
by judicial recognition of the tort action proposed herein, will 
move to ameliorate the problem. 
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADITIONAL LANDLORD 
AND TENANT LAw 
Although the antiquated law of landlord and tenant still imposes 
a number of disabilities on lessees in both contract and tort actions,m 
fortunately none of these disabilities operates as an impediment to 
175. 63 Ill. 553 (1872). 
176. The fact that many slum buildings are held in corporate form with quite 
limited assets should not-but probably will-be an obstacle to reaching the con-
trolling stockholders in the damage action proposed here. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 35 
U.SL. Week 2330-31 (N.Y. 1966). Compare BAKER &: CARY, CAsEs ON CORPORATIONS 375-
76 (3d ed. 1959); LA1TY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFrn.lA.TED CORPORATIONS 77-90 (1936). New 
York has made an attempt to mitigate this problem by statute. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 
1966, p. 36, col. 4. Perhaps, though, corporate ownership is less widespread than has 
commonly been supposed. S1ERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 121-22 (1966). 
177. PROSSER, TORTS § 63, at 411-13 (3d ed. 1964); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 355-56 (1965); Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard 
Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 310-11 (1965). A recent discussion of the problem from 
a contract perspective is Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for 
Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966); see also LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING llEsEARCH FUND OF 
COLUMJIIA UNIVERSITY, LEGAL REMEDIES IN HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW You 
CITY 127-81 (1965). 
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the action proposed herein. Even where the old tort rules still apply, 
relieving the landlord of any duty in regard to the condition of 
the leased premises, there are exceptions for those parts of the 
premises over which the lessor retains control.178 The usual exam-
ples given to describe these exceptions, such as common stairways, 
roofs, yards, walls, foundation, heating, lighting, or plumbing,179 in-
clude virtually all the facilities that are going to be in issue in any 
of the cases envisioned here. Moreover, many courts are now com-
mitted to the principle that, where a tort action is premised upon 
violation of a housing code, the duty legislatively imposed upon the 
landlord abrogates any no-duty defense which the landlord might 
have had at common law.180 These cases are also most useful in that 
they dispel any claims that the statutory remedy is to be treated as 
the exclusive means of redress for conduct which constitutes a viola-
tion of the housing codes.181 
A lease with a clause exculpating the landlord from tort liability 
also would be of no avail to the defendant. Though such clauses are 
generally valid in negligence cases, exculpation from liability for 
intentional torts is prohibited.182 In addition, there are now a num-
ber of statutes rendering such clauses void,183 as well as common 
law rules voiding contracts in contravention of statutory duties.18' 
Moreover, it should be clear, on the basis of the previous discussion, 
that an exculpatory clause in a slum lease would be a most ap-
propriate situation for the application of the general doctrine in-
validating such provisions when contained in adhesion contracts 
dealing with necessary services.1815 
178. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS §§ 360, 361 (1965). 
179. Ibid. 
180. PROSSER., TORTS § 63, at 413 n.25 (3d ed. 1964). See also Whetzel v. Jess Fisher 
Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hanna v. Lederman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 
786, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 
(1961); Saracino v. Capital Properties Associates, 50 N.J. Super. 81, 141 A.2d 71 (Super. 
Ct. 1958); Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. '703 (1922). 
181. It is not urged here that the statute creates the plaintiff's right; rather, the 
statutory standards are mere guidelines for the right which should be recognized at 
common law. The cases simply stand for the proposition that the presence of a 
statutory remedy does not pre-empt a common law action. Odom v. East Ave. Corp., 
178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1942). 
182. Kuzmiak v • .Brookchester, 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (Super. Ct. 1955); 6A 
CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1472, at 596-97, 601-02 (1962). 
183. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 15a (1966); N.Y. GEN. 
OBUGATIONS LAW§ 5-321; see Hanna v. Lederman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 786, 36 Cal. Rptr. 
150 (1963); Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953). 
184. Schoshinski, supra note 177, at 537-38. 
185. Comment, Contractual Exculpation From Tort Liability in California-The 
"True Rule" Steps Forward, 52 CAuF. L. REv. 350 (1964). On the same principle, the 
notorious .Bond-For-Deed arrangements, by which the landlord seeks to shift the 
statutory burden by a form of "sale," is ripe for some judicial reordering. See !LuNOIS 
GENERAL A.5SEMBLY, Rfil>oRT OF THE COMMnTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 
SLUM HOUSING AND RENT GoUGING 3 (1965). 
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VII. THE FUNCTION AND FUTURE OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 
One of the few things about which every observer of the slum 
housing situation agrees is that present enforcement techniques have 
been a failure.186 The combination of bureaucratic overlapping and 
understaffing, the use of procedural delays to the advantage of re-
calcitrant landlords, and the lack of militancy by both administra-
tive and judicial officials, have all worked against the achieving 
of significant change.187 The more routine proposals for reform-
such as administrative consolidation188 or the enlargement of fines189 
-are not without their usefulness, but one can hardly bring himself 
to believe that yet another round of legislative manipulation of the 
old strategies is going to induce needed changes while the same 
actors, with the same attitudes, remain to implement the high hopes 
which are reflected in each such new proposal. 
The more imaginative new ideas--such as the rent strike,100 the 
tenants' union,191 receivership in its various forms,192 and rent abate-
ment193 or withholding194-are all relatively untested, and thus less 
amenable to pessimism. Nonetheless, as indicated earlier, because 
they all share the common assumption that the landlord can be 
whipped into line by the exertion of financial pressure, their pros-
pects for success raise some serious questions. 
Insofar as these schemes deny the landlord the funds which would 
ordinarily be used for repairs, they are in a sense self-defeating, and 
186. E.g., Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 
CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 276-79 (1966); Comment, Rent Witholding and the Improvement 
of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 314-23 (1965); Comment, Enforcement 
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 801, 826, 830, 859 (1965); Comment, 
Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 
U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 180 (1963). Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and 
Remedies, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1254 (1966), defend past achievements more than most 
commentators, but their study too is ultimately a history of failure. 
187. See authorities cited supra note 186. 
188. E.g., LEGISLATIVE DR.AFTING REsEAR.CH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
(Dec. 31, 1964); Detroit Free Press, Aug. 17, 1966, p. 3, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 15, 1966, 
p. 44, col. 3. 
189. E.g., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, op. cit. 
supra note 187, at 67-86; Gribetz &: Grad, supra note 186. 
190. See Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard 
Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304 (1965). 
191. Hillman, Tenant Unions in the Common Law, unpublished paper prepared 
for the Conference on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, University of Chicago Law 
School, Nov. 1966. 
192. See Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. HOUSING 297 (1964); 
Levi, supra note 186; Detroit Free Press, Aug. 17, 1966, p. 1, col. 1. The receivership 
program in New York City has just been "scuttled" by the administration. N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 14, 1967, p. 33, col. 8. 
193. N.Y. MOLT. DWELL. LAw § 302a. 
194. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 755; N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 143b; Pa. Laws 
1965, Act No. 534, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1. 
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thus tend to intensify the very problem they are designed to solve.195 
The hope, of course, is that the expenditure of money for needed 
repairs will be less costly to the landlord than the abandonment of 
his rents.196 Where this is the case and the tenants seek only relatively 
minor repairs or maintenance, the tenants' union or rent strike can 
be effective. However, the focus of our concern is the seriously 
deteriorated building, because it is there that the problems are most 
intense. With such properties, the landlord is able to succeed eco-
nomically only if he can "milk" the property, taking his rents while 
he lets the building deteriorate and stays a step ahead of code en-
forcement sanctions.197 Unless a landlord can afford to effect the 
repairs demanded and still make an acceptable profit, the hoped 
for economic incentive cannot operate, and the rational decision 
for him will be to abandon the building or sell it at a greatly de-
pressed price to one who can afford to make enough repairs to 
get rents reinstated and still make a profit on the operation. 
Where the cost of adequate repairs exceeds the prospect of con-
tinuing profits, the tenants are the losers when abandonment occurs. 
Even where there is a sale at a diminished price, the prospects do 
not seem to be much better. Those who buy in such situations are 
necessarily the most speculative of speculators, and their success often 
turns on their political abilities rather than on their ability to pro-
vide real services to the tenants. Thus, they are likely to make only 
the minimum improvements which are required to get rents rein-
stated.198 Another technique of evasion involves a sale by a small 
operator to an owner of many properties. The buyer begins to re-
habilitate one property, putting his others on a list for future im-
provement, thus making a showing of good faith.199 In this manner, 
he may induce sympathetic treatment by public authorities on the 
195. One of the new rent abatement laws obviates this aspect of the problem by 
permitting rents to be deposited in court and utilized for repairs. N.Y. REAL PROP. 
ACTIONS LAW § 771. 
196. Another problem is raised by the ability of the landlord to take reprisals, 
in the form of eviction, or to outlast the tenants by legal delays which favor him. As 
to the latter problem, see the six month waiting provision in N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. I.Aw 
§ 302a. There are some legal restrictions on evictions. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 
(1966); MASS, GEN. LAWS ANN. cb. 239, § 9 (1956); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 756. 
See also Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Schoshinski, supra note 177, 
at 541-52. 
197. E.g., :KLEIN, LET IN THE SuN (1963); Comment, Rent Withholding and the 
Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 321 n.83 (1965); Dahl, 
A White Slumlord Confesses, Esquire, July 1966, p. 92. 
198. !LUNOIS GENERAL AssEMBLY, supra note 185, at 5. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 
6, 1966, p. 43, col. 3. 
199. NASH, REslDENTIAL REHABIUTATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND Puuuc PURPOSES 111-
12 (1959). Such buyers have been known to make some improvements, however. MEYER· 
SON, TERRETT & WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE AND CITIES 190 (1962). 
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ground that he is doing the best he can, since it is obvious that he 
cannot do everything at once. To the extent that such schemes pro-
duce only minimal work or indefinite delay, the momentum of en-
forcement diminishes and the tenant is essentially back in his old 
position. If these schemes are to be foiled, it can only be by the most 
pertinacious and rigorous enforcement by public officials, which is 
the one thing we have never had. 
Receivership proposals are designed to eliminate one aspect of 
the problem just discussed by taking the decision whether to repair 
out of the hands of the landlord and putting it into those of a public 
official. While this is in one sense an improvement, a moment's reflec-
tion will reveal that a fundamental difficulty is intensified rather than 
solved by such an arrangement. As the proponents of receivership 
schemes recognize, in order to effect a substantial amount of repair, it 
is frequently necessary to apply not only that portion of the rents 
which represents the owner's profit, but in addition at least that 
amount which would have gone to a mortgagee in the form of 
monthly payments of principal and interest.200 To do this, it is 
necessary to subordinate the mortgagee's claim to that of the re-
ceiver, thus imposing on the mortgagee the same financial pressures 
which are put on the landlord. Moreover, this financial loss is likely 
to persist for a very long time.201 Although this development has been 
said to be desirable in the sense that it broadens the responsibility for 
slum housing,202 it seems rather that it might have the opposite effect. 
For such a scheme makes the financial community the involuntary 
ally of the slum landlord. Since a basic impediment to effective code 
enforcement has always been reached at the point where the land-
lord's economic interest was truly jeopardized, it is difficult to under-
stand how enforcement is going to be aided by enlarging the investor 
class thus threatened. The more likely result is an increase of poli-
tical pressure against code enforcement. Perhaps the financial com-
munity has a hidden altruism yet to be revealed, but one can hardly 
be blamed for having his doubts.203 
200. Levi, supra note 186, at 280. 
201. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 
53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 321 (1965). 
202. Levi, supra note 186, at 280. 
203. While it is true that the receivership law has been upheld in New York, so 
that a mortgagee's lien on rents, but only rents, is subordinated to the receiver, in 
the Matter of Dep't of .Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964), 
the real question is not what the courts do in upholding or rejecting the constitu-
tionality of such laws, but how extensively public officials will utilize their leg'!ll power 
in the many thousands of cases in which the receivership law might be applicable. See 
note 208 infra. 
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One suggestion which has been made, perhaps partly in recogni-
tion of these disabilities, is that rehabilitation money should be 
loaned for use by receivers. 204 However, by now it is eminently clear 
that ordinary commercial loans to rehabilitate very low-cost hous-
ing are not acceptable investments; the inadequate rent base which 
has prevented new private low-cost housing from being built presents 
substantially the same problem with respect to rehabilitation.205 Even 
to the extent that rehabilitation can be cheaper than new building,200 
any substantial new investment will lead to considerable rent in-
creases, 207 the result of which will be to drive out the people for 
whom the program is designed. And unless rents are raised there will 
be no source from which the loan can be repaid. 
Loans for rehabilitation could be privately obtained only if the 
result were the ousting of the existing tenants, which we do not want, 
or if the lender's claims were to be given priority over the claims 
of the landlord and present mortgagee, which priorities would lead 
to the problem discussed above. Thus, any such loans must come 
from public funds as a subsidy, and it must be a subsidy of very 
substantial proportions in order to do the job in the magnitude 
which is needed. But, if we could have the amount of money we 
need, we could have already met the problem at issue through public 
housing, rent subsidies, or some other such program. It is precisely 
the unwillingness of legislatures to make the huge expenditures 
required to bring great masses of deteriorated housing up to standard 
by replacement or rehabilitation that has left us, a generation after 
the institution of the public housing program, in the deplorable 
state that presently exists. It is most difficult to see why any mere 
change of format is going to set the stage for that economic realloca-
tion which thirty years of continued misery has not brought about. 
Some confirmation of the doubts raised above is provided by the fact 
that New York City reportedly has already "scuttled the receiver-
ship program" as a failure.208 
204. Levi, supra note 186, at 280. 
205. Note 20 supra; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1966, p. 43, cols. 3-4. 
206. The Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1966, p. 1, col. 1. 
207. This is the unvarying pattern. MILLSPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, THE HUMAN SIDE 
OF URBAN RENEWAL 108, 110 (1960); NASH, op. cit. supra note 199, at 94, 186-87. Unless 
rents are controlled, there is no way to prevent the landlord from raising them, and 
if rents are held down on the theory that the landlord should absorb the loss out of 
his "excessive" profits, we are back to the same economic pressures discussed above. 
It must be remembered that while slum profits may be excessive in relation to other 
investments, it is undoubtedly the prospect of a larger than usual return which induces 
investment in such problem properties. Thus the reduction of slum housing profits to 
a level equal to that available in high grade stocks or bonds would surely produce a 
very severe market crisis. 
208. N.Y. Times, Jan, 14, 1967, p. 33, col. 8. 
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Nonetheless, the receivership programs are most intriguing in one 
respect. Quite clearly underlying such proposals is a recognition that, 
for an extremely long time, neither the landlord nor his financiers 
are going to be able to recover a profit on their investment. Indeed, 
it seems reasonable to assume that a truly large-scale receivership pro-
gram would shatter the market in slum properties beyond recovery. 
Inherent in the receivership idea, then, is a most fundamental point, 
which lies at the very heart of this article. It is simply this: Providing 
adequate housing for very low-income people is not a business which 
can offer investors the kind of profit which so arduous an enterprise 
must entail. While this is not the sort of conclusion which can be 
rigorously demonstrated, it is one which inevitably must be drawn 
from the history described in this article: The failure of private 
investors to build new housing for the poor, the consistent inade-
quacy of code enforcement, and the rise in rentals attendant upon 
major rehabilitation, all indicate that it is economics-and not lack 
of good faith or good laws-which has been the primary obstacle.209 
The present status of receiverships is eloquent confirmation of this 
fact. For the great majority of buildings taken over will either "never 
pay for themselves ... [or] do so only over a long period of time."210 
Thus any widespread use of the receivership becomes an indirect 
form of public subsidy, with taxpayers financing the rehabilitation 
of seriously deteriorated buildings. Far from showing that decent 
housing can be provided by the private market, receiverships demon-
strate exactly the opposite. It is time that we recognized the signifi-
cance of all this evidence, rather than continuing our dalliance with 
the thought that if only enough economic pressure is brought to bear, 
landlords will fall into line, buildings will be improved, tenants will 
be happy, and owners will continue to make a reasonable profit. 
This means that we must put the initiative in the tenants, who 
are most immune to the political pressure that a genuine program 
will necessarily generate; it means that we must look to the courts 
to deal the death blow, for they are the institution in society 
most receptive to such claims;211 and we must do all this in a way 
that imposes the least dislocation on the tenants and produces the 
most effective pressure on the legislatures to respond to the need 
thus manifested. 
209. What evidence we have is inevitably indirect or informal. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 
1966, p. 46, col. 5. 
210. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 
58 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 321 n.83 (1965). 
211. The recent willingness of the New York Court of Appeals to uphold the 
constitutionality of the subordination provision of their receivership law is indicative. 
See note 203 supra. 
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Of course no such severe prospect can be painless. But it is hoped 
that the proposal urged in this article can mitigate the pain and 
at the same time have a greater hope of success than others which 
have thus far been advanced. Our reasons for so thinking are several. 
First, the placing of the decision to go forward in the tenant class 
should itself mitigate the moral problem of imposing on another 
the risk of serious sacrifice. Second, such a proposal should be self-
strengthening in the sense that once one decides for himself to take 
a great step he readies himself psychologically for the physical sacri-
fices which that step involves. We see this most dramatically in the 
revolutionary who, having made the decision to seize his freedom, 
endures unblinkingly what to any other person would be the most 
unbearable suffering.212 Since the proposed cause of action empha-
sizes very significantly the need for tenant non-culpability, we may 
assume that the initiation of such actions will require considerable 
community organizing213 and the development of a group esprit 
which will promote readiness to endure, for the iterim, the neces-
sary sacrifices. Third, the prospect of recovering substantial civil 
damages should itself provide both an incentive which has thus far 
been largely lacking and a softening of the consequences to be antici-
pated from intensifying pressure upon the existing inadequate hous-
ing supply. 
Finally, the prosecution of a successful civil damage action, as 
we propose it, will not be easy, and it is not likely that a vast number 
of landlords will be attacked simultaneously or will be successfully 
sued in a very brief period. Thus it is to be hoped that the slum-
housing market can be brought to its knees relatively gradually, so 
that the legislatures may have some time to act before a great many 
landlords are immediately threatened. Because of this, it may be 
212. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1962). The success achieved in organiz-
ing tenant unions provides some hopeful evidence that the job can be done. See the 
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1966, p. I, col. I. Mr. Gilbert Cornfield, a Chicago lawyer, 
has also reported that, once tenants committed themselves to a tenant union, experience 
showed that they moved ahead undeterred by fears of eviction or other retaliatory 
action by landlords. Conference on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, University of 
Chicago Law School, Nov. 17, 1966. Nonetheless, we are acutely aware of the difficulties 
presented by a program in which anticipated benefits are rather remote and in which 
a great deal of legal service will be required. See Comment, Federal Aids for Enforce-
ment of Housing Codes, 40 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 948 (1965). Hopefully some will see that the 
ultimate benefits to be derived from such a legal breakthrough are worth considerable 
sacrifice and effort. 
213. The likelihood is that civil rights and community organizations will play an 
active role in developing awareness of the possibilities and demands of instituting such 
an action. Insofar as they are representative of the community, and insofar as their 
ability to succeed turns upon effective mobilization of the community, the decision to 
go forward will be representative rather than uniquely individual. 
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anticipated that the process of breakdown will be mitigated by the 
entry of speculators who, hoping the worst will not happen, will to 
some extent buoy up the market before the worst does in fact happen. 
Conclusion 
We do not desire to back away from the charge that in many ways 
ours is a radical proposal. In a certain sense we are asking the courts 
to recognize a new tort or at the least a very much altered form of 
a traditional tort. Moreover, we are asking them to implement 
a policy decision of primary significance in society, one that will 
ultimately cost a great deal of money and may require the putting 
aside, at least temporarily, of other important matters. 
Of course there are those who will ask: Is this a proper function 
of the judiciary? In turning, finally, to this question, it ought to be 
noted that this would not be the first time that courts have created 
new rights which have had a major impact on society. In tort 
law alone, significant judicial innovations with respect to privacy, 
privity, products liability, and, indeed, the intentional infliction tort 
itself, come immediately to mind. 
Perhaps, however, the question can properly be answered only 
with another question. If there are laws on the books (as there are 
in plenitude) and if we all agree that they state a basic and desirable 
social goal, are the courts fulfilling their proper role only so long 
as those laws remain ineffective? Only so long as their decisions can-
not achieve great results? Only so long as they do not endanger im-
portant interests in society? If the "proper" role of the courts 
is thus limited, the courts are not a truly co-equal branch of gov-
ernment. No one is asking them to contravene standards which 
the legislatures have adopted, and which executive branch officials 
have time and again asserted; they are only being asked to enforce 
those standards. If the legislatures have not meant what they have 
said, let the courts make them end the verbal mythology of decent 
housing; and if the legislatures have meant what they have said, let 
them get busy and implement their principles. 
This is hardly a revolutionary suggestion; the development of 
civil rights law during the last dozen years has illustrated precisely 
the type of judicial attitude required to implement the proposals put 
forth in this article. The Supreme Court in effect said to Congress: 
You put the idea of equality among the races in the law and we are 
going to recognize it; it may be that to enforce our orders you will 
have to call out troops, but, by George, we are telling you to put up 
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or back down. This is judicial integrity, and it is exactly what is 
needed now in the housing area. 
It is time to recognize as a general principle what has so often 
been made clear in specific instances: Because the courts are the 
branch of government least responsive to immediate pressures, they 
have the greatest flexibility and opp.ortunity, and thereby the greatest 
responsibility, to safeguard and vindicate the legitimate rights of 
minorities. Certainly the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized this, although it has put its assertion of equality as a branch 
of government-its activism-under the constitutional cloak. To rely 
upon the Constitution may have been perfectly sensible as a matter 
of judicial politics, but no one could for a minute believe that the 
Court in many civil rights, criminal procedure, or loyal-security cases 
did only what the Constitution or the statutes compelled it to do. It 
did, within the limits of the law, what those sources permitted it to 
do. And it was justified in so acting because no other branch of 
government could reasonably have been expected to provide the 
needed leadership. Judicial leadership is needed once again. 
